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3.1  Introduction 
Internationalized production, that is, the operations of multinational firms 
outside their home countries, represents a separation between the geographical 
location of production and the ownership of production. It is an extension of 
the activities and influence of  residents of a country outside the geographical 
borders of the country. 
Much of the literature on multinationals is based on the idea that they pos- 
sess firm-specific assets that are immobile among firms but mobile across geo- 
graphical boundaries. To  the extent that that is the case, the profitability  of 
R&D and the incentive to invest in it or in other activities that contribute to the 
accumulation of firm-specific assets depends on the size of the worldwide mar- 
ket for the firm’s  output rather than  on the size of  the firm’s home-country 
markets. A judgment about the quality of a firm’s management or of the man- 
agement of a country’s firms in general would take into account firms’ world- 
wide operations rather than only those in the firms’ home countries. 
In this paper, we compare the geographical view and the ownership view of 
production for a number of countries and try to assess the overall importance of 
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the internationalized production that separates the two views. The geographical 
measure for a country reflects the capabilities of the combination of the geo- 
graphically immobile factors of production  located in the country with home 
and foreign firms’  mobile factors. The ownership measure for a country reflects 
the capabilities  of the mobile factors controlled by the country’s firms, com- 
bined with various countries’ immobile factors. We make the comparisons in 
two ways, from the home-country  side and from the host-country  side. The 
home-country  view compares the production  of a country as a geographical 
unit with the overseas, and in a few cases, the worldwide production of firms 
based in that country. The host-country  view compares the production of the 
country as a geographical unit with that part of production controlled by for- 
eign firms. 
Although it is not our focus here, the ownership basis could also be used to 
compare groups of firms, such as Japanese-, US.-, and British-based multina- 
tionals, or large and small multinationals,  or those based in developed coun- 
tries with those based in developing countries. In each case, the output of the 
group of firms would reflect their command over geographically mobile assets. 
However,  in  a world  where access  to immobile assets,  such as natural  re- 
sources, is not available on a nondiscriminatory basis, a home country’s immo- 
bile assets may contribute to the capabilities of firms based in a country. 
A series of previous papers has compared export market shares and the com- 
position of exports of countries with those of firms based in those countries 
(Kravis and Lipsey 1985, 1987, 1992; Blomstrom and Lipsey 1989a, 1989b, 
1993; Blomstrom 1990; Lipsey, Blomstrom, and Kravis 1990; Lipsey  1995b). 
These export market  share comparisons have several advantages  over other 
measures. One is that production for export may be more footloose, less sub- 
ject to host-government manipulation or control, and therefore more revealing 
about economic factors than shares in host-country  markets. Another advan- 
tage of export market shares is that it is relatively easy to define the denomina- 
tors of  the  share ratios. These might  be total  world  exports, or developed- 
country  exports, or exports of  manufactured  goods or particular  products. 
Quite comprehensive trade data are collected and published by the United Na- 
tions, using classifications of commodities fairly comparable from one country 
to another. 
On the other hand, export sales account for a minority of production, and a 
small minority  for some countries’  affiliates. They are uninformative  about 
competition  in services, many of which cannot be exported and must be pro- 
duced where they are consumed. Even within manufacturing, usually classified 
as producing tradables, a concentration  on export shares gives a high weight 
to those  products  that  are most  tradable  and  a low weight  to  less  tradable 
goods. The effects of skills in advertising and marketing that enable American 
manufacturers  of  soft  drinks and  breakfast  cereals to  enter many  markets 
would probably not be evident in export market shares. 
Another problem  with exports as a measure  is that exports, unlike value 85  Internationalized Production in World Output 
added, for example, can be duplicative. The same product can appear as par- 
ents’ exports of components to an affiliate and in affiliate exports of a finished 
product. The same type of duplication characterizes the world trade data that 
are the denominators for export shares. 
The obvious candidates for nonduplicative measures are value added and 
gross product originating in a country, a sector of the economy, an industry, or 
a set of firms. The denominators  for such  share measures  are available  for 
almost all countries for aggregates and major industry groups, although the 
quality of  the data declines as one moves to narrower industry classifications. 
The numerators present worse problems, especially for measures of the shares 
of groups of firms spanning national borders. Very few countries report value 
added for their own multinationals’ worldwide operations or for any operations 
outside home-country borders. However, on the inward side, a number of coun- 
tries have coded their industrial censuses to distinguish establishments con- 
trolled by foreign firms, thus providing foreign firms’ shares of geographically 
defined host-country production, by industry of establishment. For the United 
States, the first example of this type of establishment-based inward investment 
data was the results of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)-Census of 
Manufactures  match  for  1987 (U.S. Department  of  Commerce  1992c), al- 
though enterprise-based data go back to 1974. On the outward side, there have 
been several reports on value added by U.S. affiliates, but the first comprehen- 
sive estimates covering a substantial period, with industry and country detail, 
appeared in Mataloni and Goldberg (1994). 
While gross output shares are informative about the control of production, 
they do not measure market shares. A firm or group of firms could have control 
over a market by supplying it through exports, or through control of down- 
stream activities such as wholesaling or retailing, where the share in produc- 
tion would be much smaller than the share in final sales. Information on market 
shares is rarely available on any national or world basis for consumption in 
general, although there are some data for individual industries. It is possible, 
for example, to learn what portion of  world sales of passenger automobiles is 
accounted  for by  American  companies  or Japanese  companies  around  the 
world. The data on pharmaceutical sales collected by  IMS could presumably 
be used to measure the degree of control of these markets by each company or 
group of companies. The share of each major producer in sales of transport 
aircraft is also known. What is not readily available is such data for all indus- 
tries and data on the size of markets for groups of products, needed to calculate 
market shares. 
The broadest summary of our conclusions is that the share of international- 
ized  production  (i.e.,  production  by  multinational  firms outside  their home 
countries) in world output was about 7 percent of world output in  1990 and 
had grown somewhat over the preceding two decades. However, there was a 
great variety of  experience  among individual countries. Most notable in the 
home-country histories has been the big decline in the share of  U.S. interna- 86  Robert E. Lipsey, Magnus Blomstrom, and Eric D. Ramstetter 
tionalized production. That decline almost offset the increases in international- 
ized production in other countries. The host-country data show a mixed picture 
for the individual countries, with increasing importance of foreign-owned mul- 
tinationals' production in some countries and decreasing importance in others. 
Section 3.2 of  this paper  examines  the internationalization  of  production 
from the home-country  side. It compares the production of four countries- 
the United States, Japan, Germany, and Sweden-with  the internationalized, 
and in some cases, the worldwide production of firms based in those countries. 
In section 3.3, internationalized production is examined through host-country 
reports on production by foreign-owned firms. Section 3.4 estimates the aggre- 
gate importance of internationalized production in world output, and section 
3.5 summarizes our findings. 
3.2  Production Viewed from the Home-Country Side 
3.2.1  United States 
Some hints of the role of  U.S.-based multinationals in world output can be 
derived from data on the gross product of U.S. multinationals. Changes in the 
share of nonbank majority-owned affiliates of U.S. firms in world output out- 
side the United States and in their importance relative to U.S. output are de- 
scribed  in  table  3.1.  Nonbank  American  affiliates  in  foreign  countries  ac- 
counted for about 3 percent of output in the world outside the United States at 
what was probably their peak share, and that share fell by about a third between 
1977 and 1993, after rising during the previous decade. The extent of interna- 
tionalization of U.S.-owned production (the ratio of affiliate production over- 
seas to output in the United  States) jumped from less than 5 percent in  1966 
to over 8 percent in  1977 before a long decline that brought  the ratio back 
down to less than 6 percent in 1993. 
Within the United  States there was a similar decline in the importance of 
parent companies in total output. The share of U.S. nonbank parents in U.S. 
business output outside banking' fell from 32 percent in 1977 to 26 percent in 
1989, and the share in total output fell from 25 to 20 percent (table 3.2). How- 
ever, the decline in the U.S. multinational share within the United States came 
later than in the share outside and was not quite as sharp as the decline outside 
the United  States. Among the three years for which data are available,  1982 
was the peak. The parent  share  in  US. multinational  production  remained 
close to three-quarters, rising somewhat from 1977 to 1982 and then falling to 
not far above the 1977 level in 1989.*  Thus, the role of U.S. multinational firms 
in  production  was declining both at home and abroad, a little more rapidly 
abroad. 
1. Business output excludes output produced in the government and household sectors. 
2. Parent gross output estimates are available only for benchmark years beginning in 1977. 87  Internationalized Production in World Output 
Table 3.1  US. and U.S. Affiliate"  Gross Product as a Percentage of U.S. and 
World GDP 
U.S. GDP as a Percentage 
of World GDP  U.S. Affiliate Gross Product as a Percentage of 
World GDP Outside  In 1985 
Year  U.S. GDP  United States  World GDP  Nominalb  World Prices 
1960  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  36.5  26.9 
1966  4.89  2.61  1.73  35.4  26.7 
I970  6.88  2.46  1.81  26.3  24.0 
I977  8.16  3.13  2.26  27.7  22.2 
1982  7.10  2.80  2.01  28.3  20.6 
1989  6.15  2.3  1  1.68  27.3  20.7 
1990  6.49  2.29  1.69  26. I  20.4 
1991  6.29  2.20  1.63  25.9  19.8 
1992  6.09  2.11  1.56  25.6  19.8 
I993  5.72  2.07  1.52  26.5 
Sources: Howenstine (1977, table  I),  Mataloni and  Goldberg (1994, table 6). Mataloni (1995, 
table 6),  United Nations (1993), World Bank (1993, and Penn World Tables (5.6). 
"Nonbank majority-owned foreign affiliates of nonbank U.S. parents. 
hConverted  to U.S. dollars by current exchange rates. 
Table 3.2  Gross Product of Nonbank U.S. Parents and Their Foreign Affiliates 
Gross Product 
(million U.S. $)  US. Parent Share (%) in Gross Product of  U.S. 
Multinational 
Parents and  U.S. Nonbank  United  us.  Share (%) in 
Year  Parents  Affiliates  Business'  States  Multinationals  World GDP 
1977  490,529  65 1,665  32.3  24.8  75.2  9.15 
1982  796,017  1,019,734  33.0  25.3  78.1  9.16 
1989  1,044,884  1,364,878  2.5.9  20.1  76.6  7.16 
Sources: Mataloni and Goldberg (1994, tables  1 and 3) and World Bank (1995). 
dExcluding  banks, government and government enterprises, private households, imputed rental income on 
housing, rental income of  persons, business transfer payments, subsidies, and the statistical discrepancy. 
A rough picture of the worldwide role of these firms shows a much larger 
share in world production for U.S. multinationals (parents and affiliates com- 
bined) than in production outside the United States for their affiliates alone. 
The U.S. multinational share was much greater in U.S. production than in for- 
eign  production,  and  U.S.  production  was  still, in  1989, over  a quarter  of 
world output. 
The trend in the share of the United States as a geographical area in world 
output is shown in table 3.1. The U.S. share declined substantially from 1960 
and 1966 to 1970, but during the period for which we can compare the United 
States as a country with U.S. firms, starting in  1977, there was virtually no 88  Robert E. Lipsey, Magnus Blomstrom, and Eric D. Ramstetter 
Table 3.3  U.S. Parent Share of U.S. Business GDP,”  1989 
Industry  Percentage 
All industries  26 
Petroleum extraction and refining  8 





Source: Mataloni and Goldberg (1994. table 3). 
“Excluding production in the banking, government, and household sectors. 
hExcluding  petroleum and coal product manufacturing. 
‘Including agriculture, mining, except petroleum, construction, wholesale and retail trade, trans- 
portation and public utilities, and finance. 
further change in the U.S. role. Thus, this history includes two very different 
periods for the United States and for U.S. firms. From the first half of the 1960s 
to the mid-l970s, the United States as a geographical entity had a declining 
share of world output, while US. firms’ production outside the United States 
had a rising share of world output and a large rise relative to domestic U.S. 
output. After the mid-l970s, the United States as a country held on to a quite 
steady share of world production, while the U.S. multinational share of world 
output was falling, U.S. affiliate output was declining relative to geographical 
U.S. output and their own parents’ domestic output, and the parents’ share of 
domestic U.S. output was falling. 
One reason why the share of U.S. multinationals in production  outside the 
United  States is so low is that much of the world‘s  production takes place in 
sectors in which multinationals do not operate, such as government and house- 
holds, or from which foreign firms are often barred or limited, such as transpor- 
tation, communication, public utilities, and certain  services. Even within the 
private  business  sector in  the United  States, the role of  U.S.  parents  varies 
greatly across industries, as can be seen in table 3.3. Multinational home, or 
parent, operations account for a majority of U.S. production in the petroleum 
and manufacturing sectors, but for only a small part of production in the rest 
of the economy. 
For the internationalized production of U.S. firms (production by affiliates 
in foreign countries) we can make comparisons to world totals by industry only 
for “industry” as contrasted  with  “services,” the latter including  agriculture 
and finance, and the former including mining; manufacturing; transportation, 
communication,  and public  utilities;  construction;  and  wholesale  and retail 
trade. This crude industrial origin breakdown  is shown in table 3.4. The share 
of US.  affiliates in service output outside the United States was negligible but 
stable, while the share in this  very broadly defined  “industry”  category de- 
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Table 3.4  Shares of Nonbank Majority-Owned Foreign Affiliates of U.S. Firms 
in “Industry” and “Services” Output, Outside the United States 
Affiliate Share (%) in 
Non-US. GDP 
~ 
Year  Industry“  Servicesh 
1977  8.07  .16 
1982  7.67  .I6 
1989  6.67  .17 
~~  ~ 
Sources: Mataloni and Goldberg (1994, table 8) and United Nations (1993). 
”Mining;  manufacturing;  transportation, communication,  and public  utilities; construction; and 
wholesale and  retail trade. 
bAgriculture, finance (except banking), insurance and real estate, and other services. 
3.2.2  Japan 
The next largest home country for which some production-related indicators 
are available is Japan. However, the Ministry of International Trade and Indus- 
try (MITI) surveys of multinational firms provide data on sales, the value of 
production, and intermediate expenditures. It is therefore possible to estimate 
value  added by  subtracting intermediate expenditures  from sales (which we 
use) or from the value of production. 
A major problem with the MITI surveys is that the coverage rates are low, 
vary sharply over time, and differ substantially from variable to variable even 
within  a  single year, causing  large  fluctuations  in  reported  value  added. A 
rough attempt, explained in appendix A, is made here to adjust the data for 
changes in coverage. The adjusted estimates indicate more stable growth in the 
value added of both parents and affiliates and more stable shares for multina- 
tionals in corporate value added in Japan (table 3.5A). After the adjustment, 
the multinational parent share of total corporate value added in Japan shows a 
downward trend, from around 30 percent in the early 1980s to less than a quar- 
ter at the end of the decade. Ratios of affiliate value added to Japanese corpo- 
rate value added fluctuated between 4 and 6.5 percent, with no clear trend, but 
there was a large increase in manufacturing affiliates and something of a de- 
cline in trade affiliates, a much larger group at the beginning of the 1980s. 
Multinational  shares of Japanese  GDP are, of  course,  smaller than  their 
shares of corporate value added, but the two series show similar trends (table 
3.5B). While Japanese multinational value added has fallen relative to Japanese 
GDP, Japan’s share of world GDP has risen so much that the Japanese multina- 
tional share of world GDP and the Japanese affiliate share of world GDP out- 
side Japan have both increased greatly. 
While Japanese multinational affiliate  value added grew less rapidly after 
1986 than before, the stock of Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI) rose 
more rapidly. This divergence in trends may indicate that there was a deteriora- 90  Robert E. Lipsey, Magnus Blomstriim, and Eric D. Ramstetter 
Table 3.5A  Japanese Multinationals' Value Added and Ratios to Corporate Value Added 
in Japan 
Parents  Affiliates 
Fiscal  All  All 



















Adjusted Value Addedb  (million US.  $) 
24 1,693  192,607  24,809  45,450  13,516 
293,608  225,400  29,433  57,547  14,187 
495,035  38 1,200  46,151  99,618  35,262 
n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  88,627  34,561 
542,116  438,504  45,432  95,734  43.791 
473,534  346.479  47,286  119,497  50,267 
60 1,583  45 1,925  56,059  151,879  68,886 
716,941  485,841  95,740  176,302  79,554 
66 1,076  537,301  56,542  180,918  88,760 
Ratios ofAdjusted Value Added to Corporute Value Added in Japan (8) 
31.11  58.43  11.02  5.85  4.10 
32.80  61.40  11.67  6.43  3.86 
29.53  60.54  9.53  5.94  5.60 
n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  4.09  4.2 I 
23.92  5  1.56  7.10  4.22  5.15 
23.70  44.64  8.93  5.98  6.48 
24.06  48.37  8.16  6.07  7.37 
24.96  47.15  11.85  6.14  7.72 



















Source: Lipsey, Blomstrom, and Ramstetter (1995, tables A-3, A-4, and A-5) 
.Fiscal years ending 3 1 March of the following calendar year. 
hSee appendix A for an explanation of  how adjusted estimates are calculated. 
tion in profitability of Japanese FDI, or that adjustment for the falloff in the 
coverage rates of the MITI surveys in recent years is not sufficient, or that the 
adjustment in 1986 (a year of particularly poor coverage) was too large. 
3.2.3  Other Countries 
For other home countries we have no information on affiliate production, 
and only for a few countries do we have data even on affiliate sales. 
Since 1976, German affiliate sales have approximately doubled relative to 
German GDP and world GDP outside Germany, eventually reaching around 
30 percent of German GDP and about 2 percent of world GDP outside Ger- 
many (table 3.6). However, sales are substantially larger than production.  If 
the difference between sales and production is as large for Germany as for the 
United States, German firms' internationalized output may have reached  11 to 
12 percent of German home output, up from 6 percent, and the German affili- 
ate share of world production might have risen from about 0.4 percent to about 
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Table 3.5B  Japanese Multinationals’  Share of World GDP, World GDP Outside 
Japan, and Japanese GDP 
Parents and 
Affiliates  Parents and  Affiliates 
Parents and  Relative to  Affiliates  Relative to 
Affiliates  World GDP  Relative to  Corporate  Japanese GDP 
Relative to  Outside  Japanese  Value Added in  Relative to 



















Multinational Shares Based on Adjusted Value Added (%) 
.45  27.11  36.97 
.55  29.60  39.23 
.80  29.95  35.48 
.64  n.a.  n.a. 
.62  22.01  28.14 
.74  20.65  29.68 
.83  25.70  30.14 
.95  26.69  31.10 










Sources: Table 3.5A and World Bank (1980, 1993, 1995). 
Nore: World GDP and Japanese GDP as estimated by the World Bank. 
Table 3.6  Sales of German Foreign Affiliates 
Sales of German Affiliates as a Percentage of 
Sales  World GDP 
Year  (billion U.S. $)  German GDP  Outside Germany  World GDP 
1976  68.71  15.4  1.16  1.08 
1977  81.56  15.8  1.23  1.14 
1982  172.83  26.4  1.65  1.55 
1985  191.58  30.9  1.64  1.55 
1989  373.40  31.6  2.08  1.96 
1990  463.35  30.9  2.37  2.20 
1991  477.85  27.8  2.37  2.19 
I992  53  I .47  27.0  2.50  2.29 
1993  535.29  28.1  2.49  2.27 
Sources: Germany, Deutsche Bundesbank (1991) and earlier issues, Germany, Deutsche Bundes- 
bank (1995, table  I) and earlier issues, Lipsey (1989), and World Bank (1980, 1993, 1995). 
For Sweden we have data on sales for both parents and foreign affiliates, 
shown in table 3.7.  There has been no clear trend in the world production share 
of Swedish multinationals as a whole during the period for which we have data 
since a large rise from 1970 to 1974. There was a very strong upward trend in 
the internationalized production share (the production share of Swedish affili- 
ates), especially in the last few years, and a large shift in shares from parent 
sales to affiliate  sales. The Swedish geographical  output  share  shows little 
trend over the whole period. Table 3.7  Sales of Swedish Parent Firms and Their Foreign Affiliates 
Sales (million U.S. $)  Share (96) in 
All 





1965  n.a. 
1970  (10,817)” 
1974  24,102 
1978  (32.1 79)h 
1986  46,959 










World GDP of  Swedish GDP of 
Sales of  Swedish 
Multinationals  Multinational 
with Foreign  Sales of 
Production  Affiliate  Affiliate  Parent  Affiliate Net 







n.a.  .07  1.12  6.5  n.a.  n.a. 
.35  .09  .85  10.1  3  I .OO  24.52 
.45  .I 1  1.10  10.0  30.54  24.7 1 
.4  I  .I2  1.09  11.4  26.80  29.87 
.42  .I5  .93  16.6  29.49  36.04 
.46  .22  1.09  19.7  22.18  47.10 
Sources:  Swedenborg, Johansson-Grahn, and Kinwall (1988, tables 2.4, C.4A, and C.4B), Anderson, Fredriksson, and Svensson (l996),  and World Bank (1980, 
1993, 1995).  Data are translated into U.S. dollars using exchange rates from International Monetary Fund (1995). 
”Estimated by assuming same ratio to sales of parents with only foreign production affiliates as in 1974. 
bEstimated by assuming same ratio to sales of parents with only foreign production affiliates as average of 1970 and 1978. 
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The four home countries for which we have some data on internationalized 
production or sales present quite different histories. Internationalized produc- 
tion by U.S. multinationals reached its peak relative to aggregate output out- 
side the United  States in the middle or late  1970s and now  accounts for a 
smaller share than in  1966. It has also declined substantially relative to U.S. 
GDP since 1977. U.S. multinationals and U.S. multinational parents have de- 
clined in importance relative to world output and U.S. output, respectively, 
after a peak in  the early  1980s. Within U.S. multinationals,  affiliate output 
declined relative to parent output after  1977 but regained  most of  its share 
during the 1980s, with little overall change over a dozen years. 
Internationalized  production  by  Japanese multinationals,  as far as can be 
gathered from the incomplete data available, has doubled relative to total world 
output outside Japan but remains much smaller than that of American firms. 
Relative  to  all Japanese corporate  output, internationalized  production  has 
changed little, but internationalized production in manufacturing has roughly 
doubled in comparison to Japanese manufacturing  output. Japanese multina- 
tional parents have lost ground within Japan, in manufacturing and in all indus- 
tries, and Japanese multinationals have declined in importance relative to total 
corporate output and total Japanese GDP. 
For Germany and Sweden we have information only on sales and for Ger- 
many only on sales from internationalized production. If output followed the 
trend  of  sales, German internationalized  production  has risen  substantially 
since the mid- 1970s. Swedish internationalized production, to judge by sales, 
has grown the fastest, tripling since 1965 and almost doubling since 1978 rela- 
tive to world output. 
Internationalized production has apparently increased, relative to world out- 
put, in three of the four countries. However, because of the much larger initial 
importance of U.S. internationalized production, the decline for U.S. firms has 
pretty well offset the increases in the three other countries over the past decade 
and a half. 
3.3  Production Viewed from the Host-Country Side 
A different view would be obtained by examining host-country reports on 
production owned by foreign firms. The great advantage of the host-country 
view is that the data for production by  foreign-owned firms are usually from 
the same sources as, and comparable to, data for production  in general and 
production by domestically owned firms. 
Host-country data do present additional adding-up problems since they are 
usually calculated in each host-country’s own currency. Our solution to that 
problem  is to calculate foreign-owned production  shares in  each  country’s 
home currency and then apply these shares to measures of real GDP in each 
country such as those calculated by Summers and Heston (1991). 
One advantage of  home-country  data is that outward direct investment is 94  Robert E. Lipsey, Magnus Blomstrom, and Eric D. Ramstetter 
more  concentrated  among  countries  than  is  inward  investment,  so that  we 
could cover roughly half of internationalized production with data from only 
three countries. The drawback is that no other countries collect such data on 
their companies’ activities overseas. While inward direct investment is much 
less concentrated, many more countries collect data on the activities of  inward 
direct investors. 
There are several comparisons  we can make between  foreign-owned  and 
total production  in  a country. One is to compare foreign-owned  production 
with GDP, as a measure of the importance of such production in a country’s 
total output. Since GDP is the only denominator for which we have an appro- 
priate translation to a common currency for aggregation across countries, we 
calculate these ratios of foreign-owned to total production for all countries. 
Many sectors are essentially closed to production by foreign firms, including 
various types of  governmental and household production. One can therefore 
also think of measuring foreign shares in “eligible” sectors, such as the busi- 
ness or corporate sector of each economy. 
Since the importance of internationalized production varies greatly among 
sectors of  the economy, it is also of interest to examine shares in individual 
sectors. In most countries, manufacturing is the only sector for which data are 
available. That and the petroleum sector are probably the most international- 
ized of all. 
3.3.1  Developed Host Countries 
United States 
The trend within the United States, since 1974, has been that the share of 
production  accounted for by  foreign-owned  firms has increased  steadily, al- 
most  tripling  over that  period.  By  1993, the foreign-owned  firm share had 
reached 4.5 percent of total  output and 6 percent  of  output in the nonbank 
business sector, excluding not only banks but also government and household 
production not open to foreign firms (table 3.8). 
The foreign presence has always been much larger in petroleum and manu- 
facturing than in other sectors of the U.S. economy. From less than 5 percent 
in  1974, the foreign-owned share grew to something in the neighborhood of 
15 percent in 1993, a little faster growth than in other sectors. Foreign-owned 
manufacturing by itself tripled in importance relative to U.S. total and nonbank 
business output, reaching 3 percent of the latter in 1993. 
The growth in the foreign firm share in US.  output has taken place during 
a period after the rapid growth in the U.S. multinational share of world output 
described earlier. Thus, while U.S. domestic output was growing relative to 
U.S.  multinational worldwide output, foreign firm U.S. output was growing 
faster than that of US.-owned firms. 95  Internationalized Production in World Output 
Table 3.8  United States: Share of Foreign Firms in Output, 1974-93 
Share (96’0)  in 
Total GDP of  Nonbank Business GDP of  U.S. Manufacturing GDP 
Including 
Petroleum 
Total  Foreign-  Total  Foreign-  Excluding  and Coal 
Foreign-  Owned  Foreign-  Owned  Petroleum  Products 
Owned  Manufacturing  Owned  Manufacturing  and Coal  and All 
Year  Output  output  output  output  Products  Petroleumd 
1974  I .64 
I977  1.78 
I978  I .92 
I979  2.23 
I980  2.62 
1981  3.26 
1982  3.29 
1983  3.27 
I984  3.41 
I985  3.34 
1986  3.33 
1987  3.48 
1988  3.89 
1989  4.25 
1990  4.3  1 
1991  4.50 
1992  4.42 




























































































Source: Lipsey, Blomstrom, and Ramstetter (1995, table B-I). 
*Of which more than three-quarters was in petroleum and coal products. 
United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom is a major recipient of direct investment and is one of 
the countries that has distinguished foreign-owned manufacturing enterprises 
in its Census of Production for a fairly long period. The share of foreign-owned 
firms in U.K. manufacturing production has hovered in the neighborhood of 
20 percent since 1977, with the latest years’ shares a little above the earliest 
ones, but without a clear trend (table 3.9). The lowest foreign share, 17 to 18 
percent, was reached in 1986, and there was a substantial rise after that to 22 
to 23 percent in  1990 and 1991. 
Since manufacturing  has been declining relative to other industries in the 
United Kingdom, the stable foreign share in manufacturing meant a decline in 
the share of  foreign-owned manufacturing in  the economy as a whole. That 
share fell by  about a third from 1979 to 1986 and then recovered somewhat 
but never reached more than 80 percent of the share in 1977 and 1979. We do 96  Robert E. Lipsey, Magnus Blomstrom, and Eric D. Ramstetter 
Table 3.9  United Kingdom: Share of Foreign-Owned Manufacturing 
Enterprises in Manufacturing and Total Output 
Share (8)  of Foreign-Owned Enterprises in 
Manufacturing 
Gross Value Added at 

















































Source: Lipsey, Blomstriim, and Ramstetter (1995, table B-2) 
"Share of net output of foreign-owned manufacturing firms. 
not have data to tell  whether information for all industries would  show that 
same stability as in manufacturing or a declining share. 
Cunudu 
Canada,  another important host country for multinationals,  also provides 
long series of information on the operation of foreign firms. From the  1960s 
through the mid- 1980s, foreign firms accounted for about a third of total sales 
in all industries and all nonfinancial industries, and more than half in manufac- 
turing industries. The peak shares seem to have been reached around 1970,  but 
there was little change until the late 1980s. The share of foreign-owned firms 
had  dropped  substantially by  1988, but it then  increased  slightly. Taken to- 
gether, these figures  suggest a declining  importance of  foreign-owned  firm 
sales in Canada since the 1960s and 1970s. 
The comparison of our crudely estimated value added in foreign-owned op- 
erations  with  total  Canadian  GDP gives  a somewhat  different picture. The 
share in total national output of foreign-owned production, in manufacturing 
and in all industries, reached a peak in the mid-1970s. Then it declined, to the 
point that over the whole period from 1967 to 1993 there was some decline in 
the foreign-owned share of total Canadian output (table 3.10). 
Norway 
By all the available measures, the foreign-owned share in Norway's output 
has declined over the past 15 years and particularly during the 1980s, after an 97  Internationalized Production in World Output 
Table 3.10  Canada: Share of Foreign-Owned Firm Value Added in GDP 
Estimated Share (%) of  Foreign-Owned Firm Value Added in Total 
GDP: Foreign-Owned Firms in 

















































~~~  ~ 
Source: Lipsey, Blomstrom, and Ramstetter (1995, table B-3). 
.'Sales or operating revenue multiplied by  0.3, using approximation to ratios for U.S. majority- 
owned affiliates in Canada, which were as follows (%): 1977, 32.8; 1982, 31.5; 1989, 30.1; and 
199  1, 26.6 (from Mataloni and Goldberg 1994). 
"ales  or operating revenue multiplied by  0.4, using approximation to  1972 Canadian ratios for 
foreign-owned manufacturing establishments, which were as follows (%): foreign-owned estab- 
lishments, all activities, 38.6; and foreign-owned establishments, manufacturing activity, 41.7. 
'Enterprise basis. On an establishment basis the ratio for 1972 is 11.3, and that for 1991 is 10.5. 
earlier increase (table 3.11). Within manufacturing there was a rise in the for- 
eign share in 1973 and another large rise in 1979, followed by a sharp drop, 
by  over a half, to the low point in  1985. Since then there has not been any 
strong trend. 
The dates of the major changes in the foreign-owned share, coinciding with 
large  increases in oil prices, suggest  that  relative price  changes may  have 
played a major role in these fluctuations. That could be the case if there was 
substantial foreign ownership in petroleum refining and large changes in refin- 
ing margins or margins in other downstream petroleum-related  output, since 
these would enter manufacturing value added. 
Whatever the source of these fluctuations, they seem also to have been asso- 
ciated with corresponding fluctuations in the importance of the manufacturing 
sector in aggregate national output. That relationship is shown by the fact that 
the fluctuations in the foreign share of GDP were wider than those in the for- 
eign share of manufacturing output. For example, when the foreign share of 
manufacturing output rose by a quarter from 1972 to 1974, the foreign share 
in GDP rose by a third. And when the foreign share in manufacturing fell by 
54 percent from 1979 to 1986, the foreign share in GDP fell by 65 percent. 
The trend in foreign ownership of Norwegian production seems quite clear. 
Foreign-owned production has been declining in importance both within man- 98  Robert E. Lipsey, Magnus Blomstrom, and Eric D. Ramstetter 
Table 3.11  Norway: Share of Foreign-Owned Manufacturing Establishments in 
Manufacturing and Total Output 
Manufacturing Value Added at Factor Prices: 
Foreign-Owned as a Percentage of 
Manufacturing 
Value Added at 
Purchasers' 
Prices: Foreign- 
Owned as a 
Percentage of 
Total Manufacturing Value 
Added at Factor Prices  Aggregate GDP  Aggregate GDP" 























6.35  1.51 
Foreign Ownership 50 Percent or  More, All Manufacturing 
Foreign Ownership 20 Percent or More, All Manufacturing 
I  I .59 
11.79  2.80 
14.69  3.10 
18.46  4.01 
17.23  3.43 
14.36  2.40 
13.29  1.93 
9.4  1  1.28 
11.27  1.60 
10.74  1.53 
13.58  1.87 
















Source: Lipsey, Blomstrom, and Ramstetter (1995, table B-4). 
"Estimated by  multiplying col. (2)  by the ratio for all Norwegian manufacturing of value added at 
market prices to value added at factor prices (the ratio of col. [3] to col. [2] of Lipsey, Blomstrom, 
and Ramstetter 1995, table B-4). 
hElectrochemical; other chemical, except oil refining; basic metals, except iron and steel; and elec- 
trotechnical. 
'Extrapolated from 1975 by col. (2). 
dExtrapolated from 1986 by col. (2). 
ufacturing and for the economy as a whole ever since the peak share reached 
in 1973 or 1974. In addition, there is evidence of a decline in the foreign share 
during the 1950s in the four industries for which foreign ownership data are 
available, industries that were growing relative to the average within the declin- 
ing manufacturing sector. 
Sweden 
The trajectory  of foreign  ownership of  Swedish industry  appears to have 
been  quite different  from that for Norway, although  the severe reduction  in 99  Internationalized Production in World Output 
Table 3.12  Sweden: Share of Foreign-Owned Firms in Manufacturing and 
Total Production 
Value Added in Foreign-Owned Production as a Share (%) of 
Value Added in All Corresponding Enterprises  GDP: 
Manufacturing  Manufacturing 
Establishments in  Establishments in 
Enterprises with  Enterprises with  Enterprises with 
Foreign Ownership  Foreign Ownership  Foreign Ownership 
































































Source: Lipsey, Blomstrom, and Ramstetter (1995, tables B-5 and B-6). 
availability of data after 1978 makes inferences rather uncertain. Most of the 
measures show little change in the share of foreign-owned enterprises in manu- 
facturing or in total production from 1971 through  1976 or 1977, but if there 
was any change, it was toward an increase in foreign shares, especially after 
1978 (table 3.12). After  1979 very little is available on value added, but the 
one series that does continue shows more than a doubling of the foreign share 
by  1986 and 1990. That impression is reinforced by the foreign shares in em- 
ployment. The employment share of foreign-owned enterprises rose similarly 
(Lipsey, Blomstrom, and Ramstetter  1995, table B-6), a little faster in manu- 
facturing than in all industries, but both confirming the impression of  rapid 
growth in the foreign share of Swedish production during the 1980s. 
Japun 
The data on production by  foreign firms in Japan suffer from many of the 
same defects as the data on Japan-based multinationals. In particular, they are 
based on voluntary surveys with low and fluctuating degrees of coverage. Re- 
sponse rates have varied between a high of 59 percent and a low of 3 1 percent 
but fell between 45 and 55 percent in 11 out of the 15 years for which coverage 
is known. The definition of foreign ownership has also changed over time: 25 
percent equity ownership in 1977-81, 50 percent in  1982-91,  and 33 percent 
in  1991-92. 
While those changes of definition might not have a major effect on measures 100  Robert E. Lipsey, Magnus Blomstrom, and Eric D. Ramstetter 
of production in most host countries, minority-owned operations are of much 
greater importance in Japan than elsewhere. The 1991 change from 50 percent 
to 33 percent as the criterion for foreign control does not appear to have made 
a large difference, but the earlier increase from 25 percent to 50 percent may 
have been much more imp~rtant.~ 
A way of estimating the effect of the strict criterion on estimated foreign 
ownership shares in Japan is to compare data for all U.S.-owned  affiliates in 
Japan with data for majority-owned affiliates, both from U.S. outward invest- 
ment surveys. Such a comparison is not possible for value added because those 
estimates cover only majority-owned affiliates.  However, it is possible  for a 
crude proxy for value added: the sum of employee and net income, both com- 
ponents of value added. The ratios of all affiliates to majority-owned affiliates 
for this proxy in  three of the benchmark  survey years  are as follows  (U.S. 
Department of Commerce 1981, 1985a, 1992b): 
1977  1982  1989 
All industries  3.63  3.22  2.21 
Manufacturing  2.95  3.86  2.61 
In table 3.13 we present, first, estimates of foreign shares in corporate value 
added and in Japanese GDP according to the 50 percent foreign ownership 
criterion, the official one from  1982 through  1991. The 33 percent criterion 
introduced in 1991 added only about 4 percent to the foreign share in manufac- 
turing and a little more than  10 percent to the overall foreign share, mainly 
because it added over 40 percent to the foreign share in trade. 
The second part of  the table gives two estimates of the foreign share by the 
10 percent ownership criterion used in the U.S. data. The low estimate is based 
on the assumption that only U.S. firms held any minority  interests above  10 
percent in Japanese firms. The high estimate assumes that minority holdings 
by other countries bear the same relation to majority and 50 percent holdings 
as in U.S. investment. 
The 10 percent criterion would put foreign shares higher, as far as we can 
judge: somewhere between  1.5 and 2.5 percent of GDP, according to the low 
estimate, and 2.5 to 3.5 percent, by the high estimate. The foreign share of 
corporate value added ranges from about 2 to over 3 percent in the low estimate 
and from almost 3 to around 6 percent in the high estimate, with fairly clear 
downward trends. Foreign shares are, and have mostly been, around 4 percent 
in manufacturing judged by  the low estimate but 6 or 7 to over  10 percent 
according to the high estimate. Both, but particularly the high estimate, suggest 
a decline in the foreign share since the early or mid-1980s. 
The data point to an important characteristic of value added as a production 
measure: its sensitivity to cyclical and exchange rate fluctuations. The fall in 
3. For a discussion of some of the difficulties with Japanese data, see Weinstein (1997) Table 3.13  Japan: Share of Foreign-Owned  Finns in Corporate Value Added 
and in GDP, by Various Ownership Criteria and Methods 
of Estimation 
Foreign Share (%) of Corporate 
Value Added in Japan  Foreign Share (96)  of 
Japanese GDP: 
Year  All Industries  Manufacturing  All Industries 

































































Foreign Ownership Criterion: I0 Percent or More 
Low  High  Low  High  Low  High 
1977  3.61  6.36  4.35  8.58  2.27  4.00 
1978  3.40  5.75  4.59  9.13  2.09  3.54 
I979  2.92  4.68  4.04  7.91  1.94  3.11 
1980  2.82  4.62  4.15  8.34  1.93  3.16 
1981  2.90  5.04  4.63  10.40  2.01  3.49 
1982  2.89  4.91  4.84  10.92  1.99  3.38 
1983  3.18  5.49  5.67  13.57  2.26  3.90 
1984  2.67  4.02  4.76  9.40  1.88  2.83 
1985  2.26  3.00  4.10  7.33  1.63  2.17 
1986  2.64  3.99  5.27  10.18  1.94  2.93 
1987  2.30  3.35  4.7 1  8.46  1.81  2.63 
1988  2.28  3.38  4.61  8.74  1.85  2.75 
I989  2.29  3.32  4.53  8.21  1.83  2.65 
1990  2.08  3.01  4.16  7.57  I .73  2.5 1 
1991  2.01  2.87  4.03  7.18  1.70  2.43 
1992  1.67  2.32  3.63  6.16  1.40  1.93 
Sources: Lipsey, Blomstrom, and Ramstetter (1995, table B-7) and appendix B of this paper. 102  Robert E. Lipsey, Magnus Blomstrom, and Eric D. Ramstetter 
Table 3.14  Australia: Share of Foreign-Owned and Foreign-Controlled 
Establishments in Mining, Manufacturing, and Total Output 
Foreign Share (%) of Sector Value Added 
and GDP 
By Control  By Ownership 
Industry and Year  Sector  GDP  Sector  GDP 
Mining 
1971-72  55.0  1.87 
1972-73  57.1  I .88 
1973-74  60.2  2.03 
1974-75  60.  I  2.27  51.8  1.96 
1976-77  59.0  2.29 
I98 1-82  57.9  2.36  51.2  2.09 
1982-83  56.6  2.5 1  50.4  2.24 
1984-85  51.5  2.39  44.7  2.08 
1972-73  n.a.  n.a.  31.2  6.82 
1982-83  34.6  5.87  32.9  5.57 
1986-87  33.3  5.38  30.9  5.00 
Manufacturing 
Source: Lipsey, Blomstrom, and Ramstetter (1995. tables B-8 and B-9) 
foreign firm value added from 1983 to 1985 probably represents the effects of 
the sharp rise in the exchange value of the U.S.  dollar, as U.S. affiliates, espe- 
cially those in trade, cut margins to preserve their markets in Japan. 
Although Japan’s government restrictions on inward FDI, extremely restric- 
tive  until  the  early  1970s, were  largely  eliminated  in  1980, foreign  firms’ 
shares of Japanese production are still relatively  low, leading some (e.g., En- 
carnacion  1992) to suggest that private barriers to FDI have replaced public 
barriers. Others (e.g., Ramstetter and James 1993) argue that these trends are 
a result of general entry barriers  (e.g., high land costs) and the low priority 
accorded the Japanese market by many Western multinationals in this period. 
Australia 
Time series for foreign firms’ shares in Australian output appear to be con- 
fined to mining and manufacturing, and even these cover only the period from 
the early 1970s to the mid-1980s. The mining sector is the one for which the 
longer span of years can be observed, and it is also the sector most dominated 
by foreign firms. Within that sector, the foreign share of production rose until 
the mid-1970s and then declined, the latest ratio, for 1984-85,  being the lowest 
of the period  (table 3.14). However, there was no real  indication of a trend 
before that. The share of GDP originating in foreign-owned mining production 
did  appear to have  an  upward  trend,  however,  because  the  mining  sector, 
though quite small, increased in importance during these years. 
The foreign share in the much larger, but relatively shrinking, manufacturing 103  Internationalized Production in World Output 
sector declined somewhat over the period for which we have data, but the share 
of foreign-owned manufacturing production in total output declined substan- 
tially. Thus, there is little doubt that the foreign share in Australian production 
as a whole declined, given that foreign production in these two major industries 
fell from about 9.5 percent to about 7.5 percent of GDP. 
Of the seven developed host countries for which we have data from national 
sources on production  by  inward  investors, only two, the  United  States and 
Sweden, have undergone substantial growth in foreign-owned shares in their 
production,  mainly  during the  1980s. The growth  was  particularly  large in 
manufacturing for the United States, although the shares have not reached high 
levels compared with those in other countries. For Sweden, we do not have 
data by industry for the period of high growth in the foreign share. 
The opposite trend, for manufacturing  at least, characterized Norway and 
Canada. In Norway, the foreign share in manufacturing was cut substantially 
after rising in the 1970s, and the contribution of foreign-owned manufacturing 
to GDP fell far more steeply, as manufacturing declined in importance in the 
whole economy. In Canada, the foreign share of production, which reached a 
peak in the mid-l970s, fell substantially until 1988 and then recovered a bit by 
1993, but the final shares were below the levels of the 1960s. Japan, the United 
Kingdom,  and Australia  are harder to characterize by  any particular trends. 
Thus,  among these  seven countries,  there is no  strong consensus  regarding 
the direction of changes in the importance of foreign-owned production. The 
strongest case for a trend is that of the United States, which absorbed an un- 
precedented share of the worlds direct investment during the 1980s, but that 
may have been a temporary episode not likely to be repeated. 
3.3.2  Developing Host Countries 
Our data for developing countries are less complete. Table 3.15 presents the 
data we have assembled on foreign firm shares of value added in Asia’s devel- 
oping econ~mies.~  Across  countries these shares vary in  a wide range, from 
very close to zero in India and in China’s industrial sector for a number of years 
to well over 50 percent for some years in Malaysia and all years in Singapore. 
In the three countries for which data covering all industries are available for a 
reasonably long period of time (India, Malaysia, and Taiwan), there is a pro- 
nounced downward trend in Malaysia due in large part to declines of foreign 
shares in agriculture and mining (Ramstetter  1995, 123). There are no such 
strong trends in India and Taiwan, but in Taiwan foreign shares were, in the 
late 1980s, high relative to the past.5 In India and Korea, foreign firm shares 
4. The data for China refer to gross value of output for industry, including intermediate expendi- 
tures. Figures  on sales and the gross value of  output, including intermediate expenditures, are 
provided in the appendix tables of Lipsey et al. (I  995). 
5.  Ratios of foreign firm sales to Taiwanese total output indicate that high foreign shares contin- 
ued into 1991 (see Lipsey et al. 1995, table C-8). The two value-added estimates for foreign firms 
in 1990 and 1991 are inconsistent and seem inconsistent with thc sales data as well. Table 3.15  Selected Asian Developing Economies: Share of Foreign Firms in Value Added 
All Industries  Manufacturing 
Taiwan  Malaysia  Taiwan 

























































































































b  b 
d 
C 
n.a.  n.a. 
n.a.  n.a. 
n.a.  n.a. 
n.a.  n.a. 
n.a.  n.a. 
n.a.  n.a. 
n.a.  9.5 
7.6  13.6 
n.a.  16.0 
n.a.  18.4 
n.a.  17.0 
7.0  n.a. 
7.0  n.a. 
n.a.  n.a. 
5.2  n.a. 
5.1  n.a. 
5.8  10.7 





























































































1.79  n.a.  31.3  7.1  6.9  6.4  12.0  36.3  33.4  15.6  15.6 
1.78  n.a.  32.9  8.0  7.8  6.3  n.a.  39.5  35.0  16.7  17.5 
ma.  n.a.  32.0  11.4  10.5  n.a.  n.a.  40.6  36.8  22.9  22.2 
n.a.  n.a.  30.9  12.6  12.2  n.a.  n.a.  40.4  40.1  22.8  23.4 
n.a.  n.a.  30.1  14.0  7.8  n.a.  n.a.  40.5  42.0  20.4  28.7 
n.a.  n.a.  30.1  7.8  11.0  n.a.  n.a.  43.  I  43.4  10.0  23.6 
1992  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Industry  Manufacturing 
Guangdong 
China: 
Indonesia  Singapore 
Upper  Upper  Hong 
Year  Limit  Limit  Actual  Kong  Total  Nonoil  1  2  Thailand 
Ownership definition  a  b  b  a  a  b 
Industry coverage  m 





































































































n.a. Table 3.15  (continued) 
Year 
Inductry  Manufacturing 
Guangdong  Indonesia  Singapore 
China: 
Upper  Upper  Hong 





































































































Source; Lipsey, Blomstrom, and Ramstetter (1995, tables C-l through C-l  I ). 
Notes: Ownership definition: (a) foreign firms defined as firms with 50 perccnt or higher foreign ownership shares and (h) foreign firms defined to include firms with 
minority foreign ownership shares. 
Output measure: (c) value added estimated as total sales less expenditures for raw materials and parts; (g) estimates given by the original source equal to total 
income less expenditures for raw materials and parts, electricity, and other intermediate consumption; (i) gross value of output, including intermediate expenditures: 
(j)  gross value added: (k) net value added; and (I) ratios to national accounts measures of value added. 
Industry coverage: (d) foreign firm manufacturing data refer to the sum of textiles, chemicals, and engineering (metals and machinery) only; (e)  data from surveys 
of limited companies; (f) data from industrial surveys; (h) data exclude paper and printing, precision  machinery, and miscellaneous manufacturing; (m) data refer 
only to firms promoted by the Board of Investment-including  nonpromoted foreign firms, the foreign share was 30.6 percent in 1990 (many nonpromoted firms had 
been promoted firms earlier). 107  Internationalized Production in World Output 
were much larger in manufacturing  than  in all industries. Foreign shares in 
Malaysia and Taiwan generally followed a U-shaped pattern, being relatively 
high in the mid- to late 1970s, bottoming out in the early to mid-l980s, and 
rising again in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
For the remaining countries (China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Singapore, and 
Thailand), data are available only for industry or manufacturing. A very strong 
upward trend is observable in China, though the figures here represent only an 
upper limit on foreign joint venture shares, and the data for Guangdong Prov- 
ince indicate that there are substantial differences between the upper limit and 
the actual share in  some years.  Nonetheless, there is no doubt that foreign 
shares in China have increased dramatically in recent years and have reached 
moderately  high levels in Guangdong  Province,  mainly  in  firms  owned by 
overseas Chinese.6 Upward  trends are present in Hong Kong and Singapore, 
and a downward trend in Indonesia. In Thailand, shares of  foreign firms pro- 
moted and surveyed by the Thai Board of Investment have not changed much 
over time, but it is also clear that these firms accounted for only about one-half 
of all foreign firm production in Thailand in 1990. 
On balance, it appears that foreign firm shares of manufacturing production 
have increased somewhat in Asia’s developing economies. The fact that Asian 
manufacturing has grown extremely rapidly in the past two decades, combined 
with constant or rising shares of foreign firms in these industries, means that 
the share of Asian manufacturing operations of foreign multinationals in world 
production has been increasing. Moreover, if one could account for the produc- 
tion  of the growing number  of Asian  manufacturing  multinationals in their 
home markets, the increase in the share of Asian multinationals in world pro- 
duction would likely be seen to be even more pronounced. As the Malaysian 
data indicate, internationalized production has long played an important role 
in Asian primary industries as well, though this role has become smaller in 
recent years in Malaysia. 
We also have some information on the activities of multinationals in Latin 
America (table 3.16). In the two largest economies, Brazil and Mexico, as well 
as in Uruguay, foreign-owned firms play an important role in manufacturing 
production. In Brazil, foreign-owned production accounted for about 29 per- 
cent of manufacturing gross output in  1980, the only year for which data on 
all foreign affiliates are available. Little change has taken place in the share of 
U.S. affiliates (dominated by  majority-owned affiliates), which accounted for 
approximately half of all foreign affiliate manufacturing output in Brazil in the 
beginning of the 1980s. If the growth of  other foreign firms was like that of 
U.S.  majority-owned foreign affiliates, there have been only small changes in 
the foreign manufacturing share in Brazil since the mid- 1970s. 
In Mexico, we find no significant change in the role of multinationals during 
6.  In  1992, 23 percent of  the gross value of  industrial production in Guangdong occurred in 
overseas Chinese firms (Lipsey et al. 1995,41). 108  Robert E. Lipsey, Magnus Blomstrom, and Eric D. Ramstetter 
Table 3.16  Three Latin American Countries: Share of Foreign-Owned 
Production in Manufacturing Output 
Brazil  Mexico 
Total Foreign 
Total  US.  u.s 









































Source: Lipsey, Blomstrom, and Ramstetter (1995, tables C-12 through C-14). 
"In 1982, U.S. majority-owned foreign affiliates (MOFAs) accounted for 85 percent of manufac- 
turing employment in all U.S. affiliates in Brazil and 60 percent in Mexico. 
the 1970s, and if U.S. majority-owned foreign affiliates can represent all for- 
eign affiliates in Mexico as we  assumed they  did in Brazil, the role of the 
multinationals remained unchanged in Mexican manufacturing  in the  1980s. 
In  1970,28.7 percent of Mexican manufacturing value added was produced by 
foreign-owned firms. In 1980, the last year for which figures for total foreign- 
owned production  are available, that share was almost unchanged (27.2 per- 
cent). Looking only at U.S.  majority-owned foreign affiliates in Mexican man- 
ufacturing, we see a downward trend until  1982, but then it shifted dramat- 
ically.  Between  1982 and  1990, the  share  of  these  affiliates  in  Mexican 
manufacturing value added increased by 53  percent (from 8.5 to 13.0 percent). 
However, this seems to be a result of policy changes in Mexico after the debt 
crisis in  1982. Mexico abandoned its strict restrictions  on FDI dating from 
the 1970s, which, among other things, prevented majority-ownership in new 
investments, and American firms seem to have responded  to that change. In 
1982, U.S. majority-owned foreign affiliates accounted for 60 (55)  percent of 
the employment (sales) of all U.S. affiliates in Mexican manufacturing, and by 
1990, this share had increased to 71 (66) percent. 
The foreign share in Uruguay has also increased steadily since the  1970s. 
Almost 30 percent of the country's manufacturing output was produced by for- 
eign firms in  1990. Given that Uruguay is a financial center for the Southern 
Cone, one would expect the foreign share of service industry production to be 
even higher. 
In sum, it seems safe to guess that approximately 30 percent of  our three 
Latin American countries' manufacturing output today is produced by foreign- 109  Internationalized Production in World Output 
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*Roughly estimated from country tables 
hLipsey (I  995b, table E-7). Figures in parentheses are straight-line interpolations, rounded to two 
significant digits. 
‘Including four home countries. Calculated as (col. [ 11  + col. [2]) X  100 
owned multinationals. The foreign share has been essentially unchanged  in 
Mexico since 1970. It increased somewhat in Brazil during the 1970s but fell 
back  again during the  1980s. In Uruguay, the trend has been  upward  since 
1978, but the economy is small compared to the others. Thus, taking the three 
countries together, there has been little change in the foreign manufacturing 
share since the early or mid-1970s. During this period, these Latin American 
countries’ manufacturing sectors have been growing more slowly than those of 
the Asian countries discussed above, but still faster than the world average. 
This suggests that the share of internationalized production in world output 
has been increasing somewhat for these developing countries as well. 
3.4  Measuring World Internationalized Production 
3.4.1  From Home-Country Data 
Home-country  data on affiliate  production  were  available  for four coun- 
tries-the  United States, Japan, Germany, and Sweden. Judging from data on 
stocks of direct investment, it appears that these four countries have accounted 
for about half or more of all outward investment stocks since 1960. If we as- 
sume that  shares of  world internationalized  production are proportionate to 
shares of outward investment stocks, we can estimate how much of aggregate 
world output is from internationalized production, as shown in table 3.17. 110  Robert E. Lipsey, Magnus Blomstrom, and Eric D. Ramstetter 
The share in world output of affiliates of multinationals from the four home 
countries reporting affiliate sales or output has changed little since 1977. How- 
ever, these countries’  share of  the stock of total world outward direct invest- 
ment has declined since then. Given our assumptions, we can roughly estimate 
that the share of internationalized, or affiliate, production has risen from about 
4.5 percent to between 6.5 and 7 percent of world output since 1970. 
Of course, the share of production accounted for by  the multinationals from 
these countries, including parent (noninternationalized) as well as affiliate (in- 
ternationalized) production, is much larger. In the United  States, Japan, and 
Sweden, it was probably  about 12 percent in 1980 and a little less at the end 
of the 1980s. 
We have no information as to what part of the world’s multinational produc- 
tion  is represented  by  these three countries’ firms.  If  we assumed, with no 
justification, that the parents account for the same share of world output as 
their affiliates do of the stock of FDI (48 percent in  1980 and 41 percent in 
1990), we would estimate that multinationals accounted for about 25 percent 
of world output at the beginning of the 1980s and somewhat more at the end. 
That is almost certainly a maximum estimate because these countries probably 
account for more of internationalized (affiliate) production than of home pro- 
duction. 
3.4.2  From Host-Country Data 
We aggregate the internationalized output in the seven developed countries 
we cover by  taking ratios of foreign-owned (internationalized) production to 
aggregate GDP in each country, calculated  in national currencies at current 
prices, and applying these ratios to GDP in current-year international prices 
for each country. The results are shown in appendix tables 3C.  1 and 3C.2 and 
summarized in table 3.18. 
Foreign-owned production increased its share of total output in the group of 
countries surveyed  by  a little over a quarter from 1977 to  1991, judged by 
the middle estimate that assumes minority ownership in Japan only by U.S. 
multinationals. The increase was not continuous, to judge from the five coun- 
tries with data for the most years (appendix table 3C.1), but the upward trend 
is clear. 
The shares of  internationalized  production  in  these countries  as a group 
ranged from about 3.5 to 4.5 percent. The share of foreign-owned production 
in Japan was far below the average for these countries. By the broadest mea- 
sure, Japan does not stand out at the beginning of the period, but by the end it 
appears to have lower foreign shares in production than is typical. 
Since most host countries report foreign-owned shares only in manufactur- 
ing, it is difficult to judge the implications of these numbers, which mix data 
for all industries in  some countries with data only for manufacturing in other 
countries. The second part of each panel  in table 3.18 is a more consistent 
version, limited to manufacturing output, where possible.  For manufacturing 111  Internationalized  Production in World Output 
Table 3.18  Growth in Foreign-Owned  Shares of Production in Seven Developed 
Host Countries, 1977-91 
Industry  Percentage 
Growth in Foreign-Owned Shares in Host-Countv Ourpur 
All industries" 




Assuming minority ownership in Japan by all foreign multinationals 
Manufacturingh 
Assuming minority ownership in Japan only by U.S. multinationals 
Assuming minority ownership in Japan by all foreign multinationals 
Growth in Foreign-Owned Host-Count?]  Output as a Percentage of' World Outpirt 
All industries" 
Assuming minority ownership in Japan only by U.S. multinationals 




Assuming minority ownership in Japan only by US.  multinationals 
Assuming minority ownership in Japan by all foreign multinationals 
+ 10.0 
+ 8.3 
Source: Appendix tables 3C.1 and 3C.2. 
.'Seven countries, 1977-86;  six countries, 1986-91. 
hSeven countries, 1977-86;  six countries, 1986-90. 
production there is not such a large upward trend. There was little change for 
the first decade or so and then a fairly continuous increase from 1985 to 1989 
before another dip. However, the share in 1991 was substantially above those 
for the late 1970s (appendix table 3C.2). 
The share of internationalized production in these countries in world output 
reflects its growth within the seven countries,  but also the rate of growth of 
these seven countries relative to the world as a whole. The growth in shares of 
world output was between 16 and 27 percent, the broader measure producing 
the smaller increase. The increases in the shares of world output are smaller 
than those for shares in country output because these countries were growing 
less quickly than the world as a whole. The contrast is even stronger for shares 
of internationalized manufacturing production in these countries in aggregate 
world output. These grew by between 8 and 10 percent. There did seem to be 
some upward trend, especially in the last few years, but it was not a strong one. 
The slower growth of these countries than of the world partly reflects the 
implicit weighting in these calculations, which is by the size of international- 
ized aggregate or manufacturing  production. Even within the group of seven 
countries, that weighting tends to raise the importance of the slow-growing 
United States and lower that of the fast-growing Japan. 
From these calculations, we can gather that there has been some long-term 
growth  in  the  importance of  internationalized  production  in  the developed 
countries relative to their total output and to world output. 
We have also aggregated the internationalized output in the nine developing 
countries we cover, using the same method as for developed countries. There 112  Robert E. Lipsey, Magnus Blomstrom, and Eric D. Ramstetter 
Table 3.19  Share of Foreign-Owned  Total and Manufacturing Production in Nine 
Developing Countries in Their Real Output and in Real World Output 
Share (%) of Foreign-Owned 
Production in Real Output" of 
Share (%) in Real World Output-' 
of Foreign-Owned Production in 
Seven  Nine  Nine  Seven  Nine  Nine 
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3.38  0.26 
3.11  0.24 
2.99  3.03  0.27 
3.29  (3.33)  0.38 
3.41  (3.46)  0.46 
0.21 
3.25  0.24 
3.01  0.22 
2.89  2.93  0.25 
3.01  (3.05)  0.33 




0.46  0.56 
0.59  (0.72) 
0.64  (0.78) 
0.52 
0.53 
0.52  0.54 
0.58  (0.60) 
0.59  (0.61) 
Sources: Text tables and Penn World Tables (5.6) 
Note; Seven countries are China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Singapore, and Taiwan. Nine coun- 
tries A also include Brazil and Hong Kong. Nine countries B also include Brazil and Korea. Numbers in 
parentheses are extrapolated from 1983 by figures for nine countries A. 
"Real GDP in current international prices. 
hFor  Malaysia, 1979, and for Korea, 1978. 
'For  Brazil and Mexico, 1982, and for Korea, 1978. 
"For  India, 1987. 
'For India, average of  1975 and 1979. 
'For Brazil, 1982 and for Korea, 1984. 
appears to have been a fall in the share of internationalized production in the 
developing countries' own output from 1977 to 1983, following an earlier rise 
(table 3.19). Then there was large growth in the share after 1983. Relative to 
aggregate world output there was little change from  1977 to 1983, after an 
earlier increase, but a very large rise after that, suggesting growth of over 50 
percent relative to world output up to  1990. The growth was probably even 
faster after that because foreign investment in China accelerated in the 1990s. 
The increase in foreign-owned production was much larger relative to world 
output than relative to these countries'  own output because these  countries 
were growing faster than the rest of the world. 
Even more than for the developed host-country data, the data for foreign- 
owned production  in  developing countries are limited to the manufacturing 
sector. The same ratios, confined as far as possible, to the manufacturing sector, 
are shown in the second panel of table 3.19. The time pattern for manufactur- 113  Internationalized Production in World Output 
ing alone relative to the countries’ output is similar to that for the hybrid values 
in the first panel, with a rise to 1977, a decline to the early  1980s, and then 
another increase. However, there is no clear trend over the whole period.  In 
contrast, the shares of world output do show an upward trend. The difference 
between the trends in shares of country output and in shares of world output 
results from the fact that the ratios are dominated by Asian countries that were 
growing much faster than the rest of the world. 
If  we add the foreign-owned  manufacturing  production  in developed  and 
developing host countries,  we find that there was some rise over the period 
since  1977 in the share of world  output, as indicated by column  (1)  of table 
3.20. 
These numbers understate the share of internationalized output in total out- 
put for two reasons. One is that they cover only manufacturing output, and the 
other is that they include only 16 host countries. To make up for the limitation 
to manufacturing we use estimates of the share of manufacturing in total inter- 
nationalized output, as reported by five host countries (col. [2]). 
Dividing the manufacturing  output share measures of column (1) by these 
ratios, we estimate shares of world GDP for total internationalized  output of 
the  16 host countries (col. [3]). Since these  16 host countries accounted for 
about 60 percent  of all the inward stock of FDI (col. [4]), we can make an 
estimate of the share of internationalized  production  in the whole world  by 
assuming that the share of world internationalized production of these 16  coun- 
tries was equal to their share of the inward direct investment stock. The corre- 
sponding estimates for the share of internationalized production in the output 
of all host countries are in column (5). 
This calculation from the host-country side implies a substantial growth in 
the share of internationalized production in world output, as does the calcula- 
tion from the home-country  side in column (6), but here almost all the growth 
is after 1985. The shares estimated from host-country data are smaller, but the 
growth is faster, over a third from 1977 to 1990 as compared with about a 
quarter in the estimates from home-country data. 
3.5  Summary and Conclusions 
The difference between a geographical and an ownership view of production 
is measured by the amount of internationalized production: that is, production 
in enterprises owned by nonresidents  of the country where the production  is 
located. That internationalized production is also one aspect of the much talked 
about “globalization” of production, for any one country and for the world as 
a whole. 
The internationalization of production can be measured from two sides: that 
of the home country and that of the host country. Viewed from the home coun- 
try, the question is, How much of production  owned or controlled by home- 
country residents takes place outside the geographical boundaries of the home Table 3.20  Estimates of Internationalized Production from the Host-Country Side 
Foreign-Owned 
Internationalized  (Internationalized) 
Output in  16 Host  as a Percentage of 
Manufacturing  Manufacturing Output  Total Internationalized 
Output in 16 Host 
Share (%) of Internationalized Output 
in World GDP 
Countries as a  Total Foreign-Owned  Countries as a  Share (%) of  16 Host  Estimated from  Estimated from 
Percentage of  Output: 5 Host  Percentage of World  Countries in World  Host-Country  Home-Country 
World GDP*  Countriesb  GDP  Stock of Inward FDId  Side‘  Side‘ 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
1970 
1977  1.55  65.4 
1980  1.48  60.1 
1982 
198Y  1.49  57.7 
1988 
I990  I .88  59.6 
4.5 
2.37  (60.2)  3.9  5.4 
2.46  60.2  4.1 
5.8 
2.58  62.0  4.2 
6.2 
3.15  59.5  5.3  6.7 
‘Appendix table 3C.2 for developed countries, and table 3.19 for developing countries. We  use the conservative estimate from table 3C.2, assuming that only U.S. 
firms have minority ownership in Japan. 
bLipsey,  Blomstrom, and Ramstetter (1995) 
‘(COI.  [I1 + col. 121) x 100. 
“United Nations (1994, annex table 3). 
‘(Col. [3] + col. [4]) X  100. 
‘Table 3.19. 
’1986  for developed countries, and  1983 for developing countries 115  Internationalized Production in World Output 
country? Viewed from the host country, the question is, How much of produc- 
tion located in the host country is owned or controlled  by  residents of other 
countries?”  For the world as a whole, the two views, if measured  perfectly, 
are identical. 
Using host-country data, mostly limited to manufacturing, we estimated that 
the share of internationalized, or affiliate, output in world production increased 
from 4 percent in 1977 to over 5 percent in 1990, with most of the gain taking 
place in the late 1980s. The affiliate share of world production estimated from 
home-country data rose from 4.5 percent in 1970 to 5.4 percent in 1977 and to 
almost 7 percent in 1990. Since home-country data require fewer assumptions 
to move from the sample to a world total, we would be inclined to accept them 
as the best estimates and treat those from the host-country  side as mainly a 
check on the orders of  magnitude involved. 
The general impression of a much greater importance of internationalized 
output stems from the contrast between  shares of such production  in  goods 
industries, particularly  manufacturing,  and in services. Internationalized  out- 
put by U.S. and Japanese firms was almost 6 percent of world output in “indus- 
try” in 1989, but less than 0.2 percent of the output of “services.” “Industry” 
is defined here to include manufacturing, mining, transportation, cornmunica- 
tion, public  utilities, construction, and trade,  and it  accounted  for about 35 
percent of world output in  1989, down from 41 percent  in  1970. “Services” 
accounted  for 58 percent,  as compared with 49 percent  in  1970. Since the 
United States and Japan account for about three-quarters of the outward direct 
investment stock of the four countries for which data are available (including 
also Germany and Sweden), we might guess that the four countries combined 
account for about 7.5 percent  of world  output of “industry.”  Since the four 
countries own about half of the world’s outward investment stock, all interna- 
tionalized production amounted to something in the neighborhood  of 15 per- 
cent of world “industry” output. 
In the “services”  sector, whicn covers all except agriculture  and industry, 
the internationalized  share of production  for these four countries’ firms was 
negligible, somewhere between a quarter of 1 percent and a half, but closer to 
a quarter, with no strong trend. 
Another reason for the impression of  a much greater role of international- 
ized or globalization is that our calculations  are not intended to describe the 
total output of multinationals, but only the part that is outside their home coun- 
tries. Most output by multinationals  takes place in their home countries. For 
example, U.S.  multinational  firms produced three-quarters  of their output in 
the United States in 1977,  and a little more than that fraction in 1989. Japanese 
multinationals produced 84  percent of their output at home in 1980, and almost 
80 percent in 1992. A very rough calculation suggests that multinationals (par- 
ents and affiliates) accounted for about 22 percent of  world output both at the 
beginning and at the end of the 1980s. 116  Robert E. Lipsey, Magnus Blomstrom, and Eric D. Ramstetter 
Given all the attention that globalization has received from scholars, interna- 
tional organizations, and the press, these numbers are a reminder of how large 
a proportion of economic activity is confined to single geographical locations 
and  home-country  ownership.  Internationalization  of  production  is  clearly 
growing in importance, but the vast majority of production is still carried out 
by national producers within their own borders. 
Appendix A 
Adjusting the MITI Survey Data on 
Japanese Multinationals 
Estimates for Japanese parents and their foreign affiliates are based on data 
obtained from the Ministry  of International Trade and Industry’s surveys of 
parents and affiliates, the only source that provides  estimates of production- 
related activities of Japanese multinationals for more than one year. The cover- 
age of these surveys is incomplete and varies from year to year as well as from 
variable to variable. This appendix explains the methods used in this paper to 
compensate for these variations in coverage. 
The coverage problems can be most clearly seen by  comparing the MITI 
surveys with  generally more comprehensive surveys by  a private publishing 
company, Toyo Keizai (table 3A.1). The number of parents identified by  MITI 
is usually slightly larger than the number surveyed by Toyo Keizai, but because 
reply rates  were low, the number of replying parents is far lower. Moreover, 
the number of firms reporting even such a basic indicator as sales is smaller 
than the number of replies for several years. Since we wish to calculate value 
added, the fact that the number of firms reporting intermediate expenditures is 
smaller in many years than the number reporting sales is a concern. 
For affiliates, reply  rates  are generally much  higher than for parents, but 
here again the number of firms reporting sales is often lower than the number 
of replying firms, and the number of firms reporting intermediate expenditures 
is still smaller in most years (table 3A.  1, note c). Moreover, although the num- 
ber of affiliates to which MITI has sent out questionnaires and the number of 
affiliates included in the Toyo Keizai surveys were roughly equal in 1988, in 
subsequent years the number of affiliates to which MITI sent out question- 
naires increased much more slowly than the number of affiliates in the Toyo 
Keizai  surveys. Thus,  by  1992, the number  of  affiliates  in the Toyo  Keizai 
surveys was 31 percent  larger than  the number of affiliates  receiving  MITI 
questionnaires and 2.3 times as large as the number of affiliates reporting sales 
to MITI. The Toyo Keizai estimates of affiliate employment are far larger than 
MITI estimates in the years for which comparisons are possible.  One reason 
the Toyo Keizai estimates are higher is that they apparently cover a large num- Table 3A.1  Japan:  Comparison of MITI and Toyo Keizai Surveys 
Affiliate Employment 
(thousands)  Parent Samples (number of firms) 
MITI Surveysb  MITI Surveys' 
Affiliate Samples (number of firms) 
Toyo Keizai  Toyo Keizdi 
Sent  Intermediate  Survey  Sent  Survey  MITI  Toyo Keizai 
Fiscal  Out  Replies  Sales  Expenditures  Repliesd  Out  Replies  Sales  Repliesd  Surveys'  Surveysd 
Yeard  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
1980  3,247  1,401  1,256  1,180 
1983  3,331  1,271  1,161  1,153 
1984  3,301  1,617  1,488  n.a. 
1985  3,385  1,413  1,293  n.a. 
1986  3,425  1,144  1,031  832 
1987  3,708  1,718  1,511  n.a. 
1988  3,525  1,771  1,606  ,44  1 
1989  3,331  1,563  1,360  ,359 
1990  3,529  1,776  1,616  ,553 





















3,853  3,288 
4,383  3,705 
4,962  4,962 
5,343  5,343 
4,579  4,519 
6,647  6,647 
7,544  7,544 
6,362  6,362 
7,986  7,986 
8,505  7,620 
6,270 









739  n.a. 
709  n.a. 
926  n.a. 
,057  n.a. 
962  n.a. 
,168  1,544 
,326  1,672 
,157  1,94  1 
,550  n.a. 
.62 1  2,277 
1992  3,378  1,594  1,439  1,296  3,290  10,844  7,108  6,243  14,238  1,404  2,416 
Sources: MITI (various years-a-c)  and Toyo Keizai (various years-a-e). 
"Fiscal years ending 3  1 March of the following calendar year. MITI estimates refer to the end of the fiscal year. Toyo Keizai estimates refer to the same calendar year 
(June-July  for 1983-89,  December for 1990-91, and October for 1992); figure for 1980 estimated as number of firms in June 1981 minus firms established from 
1980 forward. 
bData  refer to parent firms owning at least 10 percent of a foreign affiliate. 
'Data refer to directly owned affiliates with  10 percent or larger Japanese ownership shares and indirectly owned affiliates that are majority owned by directly owned 
affiliates. Data for 1982 and 1984-85  exclude indirectly owned affiliates-indirectly  owned affiliates accounted for 7 percent of the number of replying affiliates and 
3 percent of affiliate employment in 1980;  9 and 5 percent, respectively, in 1983; and 8 and 4 percent, respectively, in 1986. Sample sizes for intermediate expenditures 
are not calculable for affiliates but, as in the case of parents, are thought to be much smaller than for sales in some years. For example, for directly owned affiliates 
in  1983, the sales sample was 3,368 but the intermediate expenditure sample was only 2,704. 
"Since  1990 Toyo Keizai surveys have covered affiliates with Japanese ownership shares of  10 percent or more; before 1990 the cutoff is unclear. 118  Robert E. Lipsey, Magnus Blomstrom, and Eric D. Ramstetter 
ber of  smaller affiliates that may be  excluded from the MITI surveys.’ The 
relatively stable growth rates of affiliate employment implied by the Toyo Kei- 
zai surveys are much more believable than the wild gyrations implied by  the 
MITI surveys. 
Unfortunately, the Toyo Keizai publications do not attempt to compile sales 
(the only production-related indicator included in these surveys). We can com- 
pare the MITI data with U.S. BEA data on Japanese affiliates operating in the 
United States, from surveys that are legally mandatory and adjusted to com- 
pensate  for known  variations in coverage. This comparison  covers 22 to 27 
percent of the number of Japanese affiliates abroad reporting sales and 40 to 
55 percent of affiliate sales in 1983-92  (tables 3A.  1, 3A.2, and 3A.4). 
For sales, the variable for which coverage is among the best  in  the MITI 
surveys, MITI estimates were larger than BEA totals in 1983-84  and 1986-88, 
and BEA estimates were larger in other years (table 3A.2). For most years, the 
differences between the two estimates were under  10 percent, the exceptions 
being  1987 and 1990-92,  with the MITI estimate being much lower in 1992. 
BEA numbers of affiliates were smaller than MITI’s sales samples in 1983 and 
1986-88,  but the BEA numbers grew much faster thereafter.  BEA estimates 
of Japanese affiliate employment were generally far larger than corresponding 
MITI estimates. Thus, it appears that estimates of sales are much closer in the 
two sources than estimates of the number of affiliates or affiliate employment. 
MITI estimates of value added in Japanese affiliates in the United States are 
much larger than corresponding U.S. estimates of gross product originating in 
them, implying that MITI estimates of intermediate purchases are much lower. 
Moreover, although ratios of value added to sales calculated from U.S. data are 
relatively  stable, rising slowly from 6 percent in 1980 to 13 percent in  1992, 
corresponding  ratios calculated from MITI data varied from 15 percent to 58 
percent. MITI’s recently initiated business structure surveys indicate that corre- 
sponding ratios for majority-owned affiliates worldwide in 1991 (the only year 
available as yet) were close to the low end of the MITI estimates but slightly 
higher than U.S. estimates, 20 percent in all industries, 35 percent in manufac- 
turing, and 15 percent in trade (MITI 1994). Thus, if the coverage of affiliates 
in the United States is representative of the MITI multinational survey cover- 
age in general, estimates of sales appear to  have been reasonably reliable in 
the 1980s, but poor coverage appears to have had a particularly adverse effect 
on more recent sales estimates,  on estimates of  intermediate purchases,  and 
therefore on calculated value added. 
Adjustments to the MITI estimates of sales and value added, presented in 
tables 3A.3 and 3A.4, attempt to compensate for (1) fluctuations in coverage 
over time and (2) the particularly low and variable coverage of intermediate 
expenditures. The first step involves adjusting the sales series to compensate 
7. E.g., in 1992, average affiliate employment reported to MITI was 220 (MITI, various years- 
a), while the figures in appendix table 3A.1 indicate an average of  170 employees per affiliate in 
the Toyo Keizai sample. Table 3A.2  Japan: Sales and Value Added of Japanese Affiliates in the United States 
Sales (billion yen)  Value Added (billion yen)  Value Added/Sales 
No. of 
All  All  All  Affiliates, All 











































































































1,168  7,424 
n.a.  n.a. 
n.a.  n.a. 
2,989  11,691 
1,597  3,926 
2,020  2,362 
3,282  3,448 
4,539  5,024 
5,965  10,025 
53  18  8,828 
n.a.  n.a. 
n.a.  n.a. 
n.a.  n.a. 
n.a.  n.a. 
n.a.  n.a. 
550  1,068 
I ,03  1  1,199 
I .698  1,701 
2,127  1,531 
2,002  2,208 
2,104  2.349 
US.  BEA Suneys‘ 
0.32  0.50 
n.a.  n.a. 
n.a.  n.a. 
0.58  0.62 
0.21  0.29 
0.15  0.28 
0.17  0.28 
0.26  0.41 
0.45  0.59 
0.49  0.59 
0.06  n.a. 
0.07  n.a. 
0.09  n.a. 
0.09  n.a. 
0.08  n.a. 
0.09  0.28 
0.10  0.29 
0.12  0.25 
0.11  0.25 
0.12  0.23 
0.13  0.25 
0.30  833 
n.a.  n.a. 
n.a.  n.a. 
0.57  1,107 
0.19  1.717 
0.10  1,957 
0.12  1,720 
0.18  2,070 
0.38  1,935 
0.43  1,602 
n.a.  709 
n.a.  799 
n.a.  833 
n.a.  870 
n.a.  953 
0.06  1.159 
0.05  1,378 
0.06  1,817 
0.05  2,233 
0.08  2,472 
0.08  3,124 
Sources: MITI (various years-a, various years-b), Lowe (1990), U.S.  Department of Commerce (1985b, 1990, 1992a, 1994, various years), and Zeile (1994). 
“or  MITI multinational firm surveys, number of firms reporting sales. 
bFor  definitional notes, see table 3A.  1. 
‘Data refer to nonbank affiliates with 10 percent or more foreign ownership and their largest ultimate beneficial owners in Japan. Value-added data refer to gross 
product estimates by the source. Original U.S. dollar figures converted to Japanese yen using exchange rates in the MITI multinational firm surveys. Table 3A.3  Japan: Sales and Value Added Estimates for Japanese Parents 
Sales (billion yen)  Value Added.' (billion yen)  Value AddedlSales 
All  All  All 























184.59  1 






























































165,24  1 
158,765 
155,  I 50 
Unadjusted 
42,898  37,116 
62,678  5 1,422 
n.a.  n.a. 
n.a.  n.a. 
70,778  57,098 
n.a.  n.a. 
75,266  58,627 
56,922  46,803 
87,828  62,488 
152,800  79.6 11 
90,908  79,087 
Adjustedb 
51,154  40,765 
65,768  50,490 
n.a.  n.a. 
n.a.  n.a. 
72,696  55,979 
n.a.  n.a. 
72,210  58,409 
74,8 18  54,744 
85,154  63,970 
95,317  64,593 

























































































~~~~  ~ 
Source: See tables 3A.1 and 3A.2. 
Note: See table 3A.  I  for definitional details. 
"Value added estimated as sales less intermediate expenditures. For  1988 and  1990-91.  intermediate expenditures are estimated as IV/IR, where IV  = value of 
imports and IR = ratio of imports to intermediate expenditures. Due to apparent differences in sample sizes across these variables and rounding errors, this induces 
errors in the value-added calculations not present for other years. 

























Sales (billion yen)  Value Added (billion yen) 
All  All 
tndustries  Manufacturing  Trade  Industries  Manufacturing  Trade 
Value Added/Sales 
All 




































































11,136  3,205 
17,157  3,953 
n.a.  n.a. 
n.a.  n.a. 
27,478  7,483 
12,673  3,747 
10,440  5,082 
16,038  6,856 
25,926  11,233 
40,887  14,984 
39,347  15,185 
9,619  2,861 
12,891  3,178 
n.a.  n.a. 
n.a.  n.a. 
14,629  5,178 
11,198  4,367 
12,752  5,833 
18,881  7,942 
21,498  9,751 
23,439  10,577 


























































































Source: See tables 3A.1 and 3A.2. 
"See  table 3A.1 for definitional notes regarding the multinational firm surveys. Note also that data for 1984 and 1985 exclude indirectly owned affiliates that accounted 
for 7 percent of  all affiliate sales in 1983 and 8 percent in 1986. 
bFor  details on calculation of adjusted figures see appendix A text. 122  Robert E. Lipsey, Magnus Blomstrom, and Eric D. Ramstetter 
for changes in coverage from year to year. To  estimate the marginal effect of 
changes in coverage rates, worldwide affiliate sales and parent sales were esti- 
mated as functions of sales by  affiliates in the United States taken from BEA 
data and the applicable coverage rate. The idea here is to use the strong correla- 
tions between parent sales, affiliate sales, and sales of affiliates in the United 
States to remove trend effects independent of variance in reply rates, and then 
measure the effect of changing reply rates. The resulting ordinary least squares 
regressions for 1980 and 1983-92  are as follows: 
SP,  =  -29736  +  4.1794  (SAU,) +  442766 (NPS,/NP,), 
(0.69)  (5.60)  (3.34) 
Adj. R?  = 0.920, DW  = 0.83, 
SA, =  -19945  +  2.1625 (SAU,)  +  28653  (NAS,/NA,), 
(2.07)  (15.7)  (2.19) 
Adj. R2 = 0.961, DW  =  1.10, 
where NA is number of affiliates in the Toyo Keizai surveys, NAS is number 
of affiliates reporting sales to MITI, NP is number of parents sent MITI ques- 
tionnaires, NPS is number of parents reporting sales, SA is worldwide affiliate 
sales, SAU is BEA estimates of sales of Japanese affiliates in the United States, 
SP is parent sales, and t is a subscript indicating year t. Figures in parentheses 
are t-statistics. Durbin-Watson  (DW) statistics are uncomfortably  low, espe- 
cially in the parent equation, where first-order autocorrelation is definitely in- 
dicated, but the small samples involved make it difficult to correct this problem 
with any degree of confidence, and these estimates are used as is. 
Aggregate adjusted sales (SAADJ and SPADJ for affiliates and parents, re- 
spectively) are then calculated as the sum of reported sales and the product of 
the coefficient on the reply rate from the above equations and the difference 
between the maximum observed reply rate and the actual reply rate: 
SAADJ,  = SA, + (0.765 - NAS, / NA,)(442,766), 
SPADJ,  = Sq + (0.484 - NPS, / NP,)(28,653). 
The use of the maximum observed reply rate as opposed to one (implying 100 
percent coverage) reflects a primary concern with compensating for variations 
in coverage rates rather than for the levels of coverage rates. To  obtain esti- 
mates for the manufacturing and trade sectors (sector being indicated by sub- 
script i), sectoral shares from reported sales data are multiplied by  adjusted 
sales estimates: 
SAADJ,, = (SAADJ,)(SA(,/SA,), 
SPADJ,, = (SPADJ,)(SY, / SP,). 123  Internationalized Production in World Output 
The second step is to calculate value added from the adjusted sales figures. 
Since the levels and volatility of ratios of value added to sales in the MITI data 
seem clearly unrealistic, adjusted value-added  estimates are derived by  first 
adjusting the ratios of value added to sales downward somewhat and reducing 
their volatility, and then multiplying these adjusted ratios by the corresponding 
adjusted sales estimates. Because the average of MITI estimates for the years 
1988-90  is relatively low and closer to other corresponding estimates, this av- 
erage is taken as a base, and adjusted ratios of value added to sales are calcu- 
lated as an 80-20  weighted average of this base and reported ratios. The re- 
sulting calculations are as follows: 
VSADJ,  = 0.8(VSB,) + 0.2(VS,), 
VADJ,, = (VSAADJ,,)(SPADJ,) , 
where VSB is the base (average  1988-90)  ratio of value added to sales (for 
affiliates, 0.19 in all industries, 0.34 in manufacturing, and 0.13 in trade; for 
parents, 0.22 in all industries, 0.40 in manufacturing, and 0.05 in trade), VADJ 
is adjusted value added, VS is the reported ratio of value added to sales, and 
VSADJ is the adjusted ratio of value added to sales. 
The resulting adjusted estimates for sales and value added are thought to be 
more realistic than the unadjusted figures in that fluctuations due to changes in 
the coverage of  MITI surveys are somewhat compensated for. The resulting 
adjusted figures are correspondingly subject to far less variation than the unad- 
justed values. 
Finally, there is also a problem encountered when trying to calculate multi- 
national shares of Japanese value added or sales (or total output including in- 
termediate expenditures) at the sector level. If one calculates the ratio of parent 
sales to total output on a national accounts basis for the trade sector, the re- 
sulting ratios are 1.68 to 2.25 (tables 3A.3 and 3A.5). If one uses the Ministry 
of Finance’s corporation statistics to calculate parent shares of sales, these ra- 
tios fall to the 0.29-0.40  range. In other words, either differences between the 
definition of total sales and total output (i.e., inventory changes) or differences 
in accounting by establishments (national accounts data) or enterprises (corpo- 
ration and multinational firm statistics) are extremely large. Due to the control 
of  a large number of nontrade establishments by  large trading firms in Japan, 
the latter is probably by far the larger factor. This makes the use of the corpora- 
tion statistics preferable for sectoral-level  analysis, but use of these data may 
lead  to  overestimation  of  multinational  shares  because  estimates  of  value 
added based on corporation statistics are below  national  accounts estimates 
of GDP. Table 3A.5  Japan: Sales or Total Output and Value Added 
Sales or Total Output (billion yen)  Value Added (billion yen)  Value Added/Sales 
All  All  All 



































































All Corporations in Jupun" 
313,737  164,405  69,773  47,667 
360,230  200,482  82,230  56,508 
378,607  211,635  89,955  60,201 
392,407  231,619  95,000  62,497 
404,049  246,152  92,463  71,117 
448,820  273,814  103,733  79,388 
471,390  30 1.925  1 13,274  85,200 
484,382  315,698  122,623  83,630 
529,832  353,891  132,240  97.218 
550,597  381,881  137,005  107,446 
535,788  387,752  132,702  11 I,  I63 
55,396  239,95  1  70,232  36,792 
6 1,900  279,169  81,416  41,774 
64,698  300,429  89,245  41,977 
65,896  320,258  94,673  42,836 
67,189  334,450  96,262  43,567 
70,158  3493  16  99,297  45,540 
74,306  373,137  106,649  48,010 
78,391  398,238  114,455  50,377 
84,9 I3  426,559  123,443  54,501 
90,286  45 1,873  131,336  57,830 
92.326  461,334  129,570  59,273 



































































Sources: Japan, Economic Planning Agency (various years) and Japan, Ministry of Finance (various years). 
"Data refer to fiscal years ending 31 March of following calendar year. Data in "sales or total output" columns refer to sales. Value added is estimated as sales less 
cost of sales plus labor costs. 
hData  refer to calendar years. Data in "sales or total output" columns refer to total output, including intermediate expenditures. Value added is evaluated at producer 
prices. Appendix B 
Table 3B.1  Estimating Foreign-Owned Production in Japan, Including Minority-Owned Firms 
US.-Owned Affiliates in Japan 
Sum of Employee Compensation and Net Income 
Value Added  US.  Dollars  Ratio: 
Exchange  in  Foreign  (million)  Yen (billion)  Total to 
Rate"  Majority-  Majority 
(yen per  Owned Firmsh  Majority  Majority  Minority  Owned 
US.$)  (billion yen)  Total'  Owned'  Total  Owned  Owned  (3)/(4) 
Year  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Ratio: Gross 




Income in U.S. 
Gross Product  Majority-  Firms 
Estimated Value Added in 
Foreign-Owned (2  10%) 
of Majority  Owned 
Ownedd  Affiliates  High'  Low' 
(billion US.$)  (9)44i  (2)*(8)  (2)+[(7)*(10)1 









































5,523  1,522 
7,236  2,249 
8,300  2.876 
8.467  3,247 
9,476  3,511 
13,478  5,597 
15,487  6,991 
18,830  8,532 


















































4,587  2.040 




(I  ,763) 
(1.708) 



























inued) Table 3B.1  (continued) 
Ratio: Gross 
Product to Sum 












1990  144.79 
1991  134.71 
1992  126.65 




Sum of Employee Compensation and Net Income 
US. Dollars 
(million)  Yen  (billion) 
Majority 
Total.  Owned'  Total 
(3)  (4)  (5) 
20,506  9,209  2,969 
22,707  10,629  3,059 
21,673  10,851  2,745 


































Estimated Value Added in 













1.45  1 
1.415 
10,639  7,36S 
10.961  7,659 
8,982  6,486 
~  ~____ 
Nure: Numbers in parentheses were interpolated on a straight line. 
'International Monetary Fund (1995). 
"Lipsey, Blomstrom, and Ramstetter (1995, table 8-7). 
'US.  Department of  Commerce (1981, 1985a. 1992b) and corresponding annual volumes. 
"Mataloni and Goldberg (1994) and Matdloni (1995). 
'Assuming  the same ratio of total to majority-owned in all countries as in United States. 
'Assuming only U.S. firms had minority holdings. Table 3B.2  Estimating Foreign-Owned Manufacturing Production in Japan, Including Minority-Owned  Firms 
U.S.-Owned Manufacturing Affiliates in Japan 
Sum of Employee Compensation and Net Income 
Value Added  U.S. Dollars  Ratio: 
Exchange  in Foreign  (million)  Yen (billion)  Totdl to  Gross Product 
Rate'  Majority-  Majority  of Majority 
(yen per  Owned Firmsh  Majority  Majority  Minority  Owned  Owned" 
U.S.$)  (billion yen)  Total'  Owned'  Total  Owned  Owned  (3)/(4)  (billion US.$) 
Year  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Ratio: Gross 
Product to Sum 





Estimated Value Added in 





































































































2,178  1.594 
(I  S79) 
(1.565) 
(I  ,550) 
(1.535) 
(I ,520) 
























5,219 Table 3B.2  (continued) 
Ratio: Gross 




Value Added  U.S. Dollars  Ratio:  Income in US. 
US.-Owned Manufacturing Affiliates in Japan 
Sum of Employee Compensation and Net Income 
Estimated Value Added in 
Foreign-Owned (2  10%) 
Finns  Exchange  in Foreign  (million)  Yen  (billion)  Total to  Gross Product  Majority- 
Rate#  Majority-  Majority  of Majority  Owned 
(yen per  Owned Firmsb  Majority  Majority  Minority  Owned  Ownedd  Affiliates  High'  Low' 
US.$)  (billion yen)  Total'  Owned  Total  Owned  Owned  (3)/(4)  (billion US.$)  (9)K4)  (2)*(8)  (2)+[(7)*(10)1 
Year  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
1989  137.96  3,852  13,450  5.147  1,856  710  1,146  2.613  7,668  1.490  10,066  5,559 
1990  144.79  3,674  13,867  5.090  2,008  737  1,271  2.724  7,305  1.435  10,009  5,498 
1991  134.71  3,882  14,384  5,680  1,938  765  1,173  2.532  7,932  1.396  9,831  55  19 
1992  126.65  3,463  13,418  5,686  1,699  720  979  2.360  7,883  1.386  8,172  4,821 
1993  111.20  14,896  6,597  1,656  734  922  2.258  8,993  1.363 
Note; Numbers in parentheses were interpolated on a straight line. 
"International Monetary Fund (I  995). 
"ipsey,  Blomstrom, and Ramstetter (1995, table 8-7). 
'U.S. Department of  Commerce (1981, 1985a, 1992b) and corresponding annual volumes 
dMataloni  and Foldberg (1994) and Mataloni (1995). 
?Assuming the same ratio of  total to majority-owned in all countries as in United States. 
'Assuming only US.  firms had minority holdings. Appendix C 
Table 3C.1  Share of Foreign-Owned Production in Seven Developed Countries in Their Real Output under Three Assumptions about Foreign 
Minority Ownership in Japan 
Assuming Minority Ownership in Japan by 
Foreign Multinationals in Same Proportion 
to Majority Ownership as for United States 
Assuming Minority Ownership in Japan 
Only by U.S. Multinationals 
Seven  Six  Five  Seven  Six  Five  Seven  Six  Five 
Omitting Minority Ownership in Japan 













3.28  3.10 
(3.59)’  3.39 
(3.74)d 
3.76  3.64 
4.24 
(4.34)’  4.20 
(4.34)’  4.21 
2.47  2.34 
2.47 
Share (%) of Foreign-Owned Production in Real Outputh 
3.12  3.50  3.33  3.35  3.83 
3.42  (3.79Y  3.60  3.63  (4.00)’ 
3.56  (3.93)d  3.76  (4.  I 6)d 
3.77  3.97 
3.67  3.88 
3.65  3.83 
3.65  3.91  3.80  3.81  4.13 
4.24  4.38  4.38 
4.21  (4.47)’  4.35  4.35  (4.64)’ 
4.2 1  (4.47)’  4.35  4.35  (4.64y 
2.35  2.55  2.42  2.43  2.79 
2.48  2.57  2.58 





















(continued) Table 3C.1  (continued) 
Assuming Minority Ownership in Japan by 
Foreign Multinationals in Same Proportion 
to Majority Onwership as for United States 
Assuming Minority Ownership in Japan 
Only by U.S. Multinationals 
Seven  Six  Five  Seven  Six  Five  Seven  Six  Five 
Omitting Minority Ownership in Japan 









(2.49)’  2.35  2.37 
(2.58)d  2.45 
2.3  I 
2.33 
2.46  2.38  2.36 
2.85 
(2.94)’  2.83  2.8 1 
(2.87)’  2.75 
(2.60)’  2.46  2.47 
(2.70)*  2.57 
2.44 
2.45 
2.55  2.47  2.46 
2.95 
(3.03)’  2.93  2.92 
(2.95)’  2.84 
(2.84)’  2.70  2.73 
(3.05)d  2.93 
2.82 
2.66 
2.84  2.77  2.76 
3.21 
(3.26)’  3.18  3.17 
(3.17)’  3.08 
~  ~~  ~ 
Sources: Text tables, appendix B, and Penn World Tables (5.6). 
Note; Seven countries are Australia, Japan, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada. Six countries exclude Australia. Five countnes 
exclude Australia and Sweden. 
‘In  1977, average of  1974 and 1979 for Canada. In  1978, U.K. figure for 1977. In  1979, figure for Sweden from 1978. In 1980, U.K. figure for 1979. In  1982, U.K. 
figure for 1981. In 1987, figure for Sweden from 1986. In 1988, figure for Norway from 1987. In 1991, figures for both Norway and Sweden from 1990. 
hReal  GDP in current international prices. 
‘Extrapolated from 1977 by figures for six countries. 
dExtrapolated from 1979 by figures for five countries 
‘Extrapolated from 1986 by  figures for five countries Table 3C.2  Share of Foreign-Owned  Production in Seven Developed Countries in World Output under Three Assumptions about Foreign 
Minority Ownership in Japan 
Assuming Minority Ownership by Foreign 
Assuming Minority Ownership Only by  U.S.  Multinationals in Same Proportion to 
Multinationals  Majority Ownership as for United States 
Seven  Six  Five  Seven  Six  Five  Seven  Six  Five 
Omitting Minority Ownership in Japan 


















1.22  1.12 
(1.33)’  I .22 
1.38  1.29 
1  SO 
(I  .57)d  I .48 
(1.55)d  1.45 
0.93  0.85 
0.89 
(0.90)’  0.82 
Share (%) in World Output’  uf  Foreign-Owned Production 
1.11  1.31  1.21  1.19  1.43 
1.21  (1.41)‘  1.30  1.29  (I  .49)’ 
1.22  1.29 
I .30  1.37 
I .25  1.32 
1.26  1.32 
I .27  1.43  1.35  1.33  1.5 1 
1.48  I .55  1.53 
1.45  (1  .62)d  1.53  1 SO  (I  .68)d 
1.43  (1.59y  1 so  1.48  (1.65)’ 
0.84  0.96  0.88  0.87  1.04 
0.88  0.93  0.92 
0.8 1  (0.93)’  0.86  0.85  (1.02Y 
0.85  0.89 
0.79  0.83 
0.80  0.84 

























0.92 Table 3C.2  (continued) 
Omitting Minority Ownership in Japan 
Assuming Minority Ownership Only by U.S. 
Multinationals 
Assuming Minority Ownership by Foreign 
Multinationals in Same Proportion to 
Majority Ownership as for United States 
Seven  Six  Five 
YeaP  Countries  Countries  Countries 
1986  0.90  0.84  0.82 
1989  0.99 
1990  (1  .06)d  0.99  0.97 
1991  (1 .o2y  0.93 
Seven  Six  Five 
Countries  Countries  Countries 
0.93  0.88  0.86 
1.03 
(  I.  10)d  I .03  1.01 
(1  .05)d  0.96 
Seven  Six  Five 
Countries  Countries  Countries 
1.04  0.98  0.96 
1.12 
(1.18)d  1.12  1.09 
(1. 13)d  1.04 
~~~  ~~ 
Sources: Text tables, appendix B, and Penn World Tables (5.6). 
Note: Seven countries are Australia, Japan, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada. Six countries exclude Australia. Five countries 
exclude Australia and Sweden. 
”In 1977, average of  1974 and 1979 for Canada. In 1978, U.K. figure for 1977. In  1979, figure for Sweden from 1978. In  1980, U.K. figure for 1979. In 1982, U.K. 
figure for 1981. In 1987, figure for Sweden from 1986. In 1988, figure for Norway from 1987. In 1991, figures for both Norway and Sweden from 1990. 
bReal  GDP in current international prices. 
‘Extrapolated from 1977 by figures for six countries. 
“Extrapolated  from 1979 by figures for five countries 
‘Extrapolated from 1986 by figures for five countries. 133  Internationalized Production in World Output 
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Comment  Raymond J. Mataloni, Jr. 
This paper by  Blomstrom, Lipsey, and Ramstetter examines the changing role 
of multinational companies (MNCs) in the world economy using time-series 
estimates of their production of goods and services (MNC gross product). The 
first half of the paper examines MNC production from the home-country per- 
spective  by  measuring  production  shares  for  home-country-based  MNCs; 
these include parent company shares of home-country GDP, foreign affiliate 
shares of foreign-host-country  GDP, and whole MNC shares of gross world 
product. The second half examines MNC production  from the host-country 
perspective, calculating the foreign-country-based MNC share of host-country 
GDP. The research is significant in both its scope and methods; the authors 
have compiled an extensive collection of data on MNC production in terms of 
both the number of countries and the number of years covered, and they use a 
variety of ratios to uncover meaningful trends. 
My comments will deal primarily  with the share of  world production ac- 
counted for by home-country MNCs, first because it is the broadest measure, 
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but more important because it deals with a central theme of this conference: 
How do you measure the competitiveness of a nation’s companies in an increas- 
ingly integrated global economy? This share should reflect the “competitive- 
ness” of home-country MNCs, in the sense that it reflects the quality of their 
geographically mobile corporate assets (such as management, production tech- 
niques, and designs); however, because all world markets are not equally ac- 
cessible for a given country’s firms, the share will also be influenced by barriers 
to direct investment and the additional costs to foreign versus domestic produc- 
tion. This ownership-based measure of a nation’s companies’ standing in the 
global economy differs from the other ownership-based measure presented at 
this conference (the Baldwin and Kimura framework) because it encompasses 
MNC production for all customers-home-country  and foreign alike. 
The paper presents the home-country MNC share of world production for 
two countries (the United States and Japan) because they are the only ones for 
which all of the necessary data are available. (No other countries are known to 
produce  estimates  of  parent  company  production.)  Over  the period  exam- 
ined-roughly  speaking, the  1980s-there  were markedly different changes 
in this share for the two groups of MNCs. The share of world production ac- 
counted for by Japanese MNCs increased from 1.5 to 4.1 percent while that 
accounted for by U.S. MNCs declined from 8.7 to 6.7 percent. Although it is 
quite possible that these divergent changes partly reflect changes in the relative 
competitiveness of Japanese and US.  MNCs, there are other factors that may 
have contributed. The bulk of my comments will deal with those other factors 
and  I  hope,  in  doing  so,  will  offer  possible  future  improvements  to  this 
measure. 
The first factor, other than changes in competitiveness, is the convention of 
introducing all existing domestic operations to the parent company universe 
once a company undertakes its first foreign direct investment. When a large 
domestic company suddenly becomes a multinational by establishing as little 
as one foreign affiliate,  it usually causes a sizable increase in the aggregate 
parent company data and only a minor (if not negligible) increase in the aggre- 
gate foreign affiliate data. For example,  suppose that a large U.S. company 
such as General Motors were a purely domestic manufacturer and that it had 
U.S. production valued at $50 billion. If GM suddenly became a U.S. parent 
by  establishing a Canadian affiliate with production valued at $100 million, 
U.S. MNC gross product would be increased by $50.1 billion, of which only 
$100 million (or well under 1 percent) reflected an actual expansion of produc- 
tion. Thus large changes can occur in aggregate MNC production  data that 
have little to  do with actual expansion-or  heightened competitiveness-of 
given MNCs. 
It is likely that the “new parent company” effect had a much greater impact 
on the Japanese MNC data than on the U.S. MNC data. The 1980s was a period 
of great expansion in Japanese direct investment abroad and was accompanied 
by  a rise in the number of Japanese parent companies. During  1980-88,  the 
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(up 12 percent). By comparison, the U.S. parent company universe was much 
more stable, showing a net increase of only 71 companies (up 3 percent) during 
1982-89.  Perhaps consequently, Japanese parent companies accounted for the 
bulk (92 percent) of the growth in the share of world production accounted for 
by Japanese MNCs. In fact, had the Japanese parent share of worldwide GDP 
remained unchanged, while the Japanese foreign affiliate share increased as it 
did, the share of  world production accounted for by Japanese MNCs would 
have only increased marginally (from 1.5 to 1.7 percent). To the extent that the 
rise in Japanese parent company production reflected additions to the parent 
company universe rather than expansion by existing parent companies, the rise 
in the Japanese MNC share of world production  is unrelated  to heightened 
competitiveness of given Japanese MNCs. 
The phenomenon of new MNCs causing large increases in the parent com- 
pany data, by bringing well-established domestic operations into the MNC uni- 
verse, can cause analytical problems that cannot readily be controlled, or ad- 
justed, for by data users. Any solution (if one exists) must come from the data 
producers. 
Exchange rate changes are the second factor, other than rising competitive- 
ness, that may have significantly boosted the Japanese MNC share of world 
production  (measured in U.S. dollars) during the  1980s. The home-country 
MNC shares of world production were calculated in U.S. dollars. During the 
period  for  which  the  Japanese  shares  were  calculated-1980  to  1988- 
the Japanese yen appreciated 62 percent relative to the U.S. dollar. Because the 
yen’s appreciation was significantly greater against the dollar than against other 
foreign currencies, it boosted the dollar value of both Japanese parent produc- 
tion (translated from yen to dollars) and Japanese foreign affiliate production 
(translated from foreign currency to yen to dollars). Because Japanese parents 
accounted for 93 percent of Japanese MNC production worldwide in 1988, the 
exchange rate effect on the dollar value of their production alone would have 
increased the dollar value of Japanese MNC production by roughly 58 percent 
(93 percent of 62 percent). 
During the roughly comparable period for which the U.S. shares were calcu- 
lated-1982  to 1989-the  dollar depreciated about 20 percent against other 
currencies, on average, which boosted the dollar value of U.S. foreign affiliate 
production. However, because foreign affiliates accounted for only 23 percent 
of U.S. MNC production worldwide in  1989, the exchange rate changes in- 
creased the dollar value of US. MNC production by only 5 percent, roughly 
(23 percent of 20 percent). 
There are perhaps two ways that the comparison of Japanese and U.S. MNC 
shares of world production can be made more reflective of actual changes in 
the underlying competitiveness of those companies. First, to exclude the ef- 
fects of exchange rate changes, the shares could be computed in base-period 
exchange rates. Researchers in the International  Investment Division of the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) may eventually be able to produce such 
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rate (and price) changes on U.S. MNC gross product and evaluating the utility 
of developing alternative measures that exclude the effects of these changes. 
Second, it  may be possible  to exclude the effects of  new parent companies 
entering the MNC universe. The most restrictive solution would be to exclude 
parent companies from the analysis and to compare the foreign affiliate pro- 
duction shares of world GDP excluding the home country. Another  possible 
solution would be to produce  a subset of data for “well established’ MNCs 
and to restrict the analysis to this group. (Obviously, this could be done only 
with the cooperation of the statistical agencies that produce the data.) Neither 
of these “solutions” is perfect in that something is lost for whatever is gained; 
in the first case, the parent company perspective is lost, and in the second, the 
meaningful effects of new MNCs on the foreign affiliate data arc lost. 
In addition to the statistical issues just mentioned, there may also be a con- 
ceptual limitation to the MNC world production shares. Despite growing open- 
ness in the world economy, MNCs retain  a competitive  advantage  at home. 
They can be shielded from cross-border foreign competition through tariff or 
nontariff barriers and from local foreign competition through explicit barriers 
to foreign direct investment or less tangible barriers such as language and cul- 
tural differences or restrictive market structures (such as the Japanese keiretsu 
system). These advantages could have a major effect on the MNC world pro- 
duction shares because an overwhelming share of global MNC production oc- 
curs in the home country (77 percent for US. MNCs in  1989 and 93 percent 
for Japanese MNCs in 1988). Therefore, when examining the world production 
shares for any two countries’ MNCs, it is important to consider the relative 
openness of their domestic markets. 
I would like to end by  noting steps that BEA has taken to maintain and I 
hope expand its MNC gross product estimates in order to facilitate this type of 
research. Since the release, in the February  1994 Survey of  Current Business, 
of the U.S. MNC gross product estimates used in this paper, the bureau  has 
released revised  1991 estimates of gross product by  majority-owned  foreign 
affiliates in the June 1994  Survey, as well as revised 1992 and preliminary  1993 
estimates in the June 1995 Survey. In addition, annual estimates of U.S. parent 
company, and thus worldwide U.S. MNC, gross product may soon be available. 
Those estimates are currently available only in benchmark  survey years (the 
last of which covered 1989) because the necessary data items are not collected 
in the  annual  surveys. The bureau  has proposed  adding  the necessary  data 
items to  its annual  surveys following  the  1994 benchmark  survey. If  these 
changes are approved, U.S. parent, foreign affiliate, and worldwide US.  MNC 
gross product will be available annually from 1994 forward. Worldwide US. 
MNC gross product estimates are an important addition to the statistical infor- 
mation on MNCs that can enhance our understanding of direct investment, the 
operations of multinational companies, and the relevance of geography-based 
and ownership-based measures of international transactions. 